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Abstract
We add local variables to quantum relational Hoare logic (Unruh, POPL 2019). We de-
rive reasoning rules for supporting local variables (including an improved “adversary rule”).
We extended the qrhl-tool for computer-aided verification of qRHL to support local vari-
ables and our new reasoning rules.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we add local variables to the programming language underlying the quantum
relational Hoare logic (qRHL) from [28], develop some reasoning rules related to this change,
and added support for our extensions to the qrhl-tool [23] that enables computer-verified
reasoning in qRHL.
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qRHL is a logic that allows us to establish pre- and postconditions of pairs of quantum
programs, thereby reasoning about the relationship between those two programs. (E.g., in the
simplest case, establish that they do the same thing.) qRHL was designed with security proofs
for quantum cryptography in mind, following the example of probabilistic relational Hoare logic
(pRHL) [4] using in the EasyCrypt tool for classical security proofs.
To understand the motivation for and challenges in adding local variables, we first explain a
bit of the background and motivation behind qRHL:
Post-quantum security. Quantum computers have long been known to be a potential threat
to cryptographic protocols, in particular public key encryption. Shor’s algorithm [20] allows us
to efficiently solve the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, thus breaking RSA
and ElGamal and variants thereof. This breaks all commonly used public key encryption and
signature schemes. Of course, as of today, there are no quantum computers that even come close
to being able to execute Shor’s algorithm on reasonable problem sizes. Yet, there is constant
progress towards larger and more powerful quantum computers (see, e.g., the recent breakthrough
by Google [1]). In light of this, it is likely that quantum computers will be able to break today’s
public key encryption and signature schemes (and possibly other kinds of cryptosystems) in
the foreseeable future. Since the development, standardization, and industrial deployment of
a cryptosystem can take many years, we need to develop and analyze future post-quantum
secure protocols already today. One important step in this direction is the NIST post-quantum
competition [17] that will select a few post-quantum public-key encryption and signature schemes
for industrial standardization.
Verifying classical cryptography using pRHL. Cryptographic security proofs tend to be
complex, and, due to their complexity, error prone. Small mistakes in a proof can be difficult to
notice and may invalidate the whole proof. For example, the proof of the OAEP construction [6]
went through a number of fixes [21, 11, 12] until it was finally formally proven in [3] after years
of industrial use. The PRF/PRP switching lemma was a standard textbook example for many
years before it was shown that the standard proof is flawed [7]. And more recently, an attack
on the ISO standardized blockcipher mode OCB2 [15] was found [14], even though OCB2 was
believed to be proven secure by [19].
While a rigorous and well-structured proof style (e.g., using sequences of games as advocated
in [7, 22]) can reduce the potential for hidden errors and imprecisions, it is still very hard to
write a proof that is 100% correct. And especially if a mistake in a proof happens in a step that
seems very intuitive, it is quite likely that the mistake will also not be spotted by a reader.
To avoid this, formal (computer-aided) verification can be employed. Typically, a formal
version of the sequences-of-games approach is used. In this approach, roughly speaking, the
security of a cryptographic scheme is represented by the probability that a certain event happens
in a certain program (encoding both the adversary and the scheme), and then this game is
rewritten step-by-step, and on each step, it is shown that the old and new game stand in some
relationship, until a final game is reached for which determining the probability of the event of
interest is trivial to bound.
A number of frameworks/tools use this approach for verifying classical cryptography: Cryp-
toVerif [9], CertiCrypt [4], EasyCrypt [2], FCF [18], CryptHOL [5], and Verypto [8]. CryptoVerif
tries to automatically determine a sequence of games by using a set of fixed rewriting rules for
games. This has the advantage of reducing user effort, but it also means that the framework is
more limited in terms of what game transformations are possible. In contrast, the other frame-
works require the user to explicitly specify the games that constitute the security proof (as is
done in a pen-and-paper proof), and to additionally provide justification for the fact that two
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consecutive games are indeed related as claimed. This justification will often be considerably
more detailed than in a pen-and-paper proof where the fact that two slightly different games are
equivalent will often be declared to be obvious.
One approach for proving the relationship of consecutive games is to give a proof in rela-
tional Hoare logic. Relational Hoare logic is a logic that allows us to express the relationship
between two programs by specifying a relational precondition and a relational postcondition.
A relational Hoare judgment of the form {A}c ∼ d{B} intuitively means that if the variables
of the programs c and d are related as described by the precondition A before execution, and
we execute c and d, then afterwards their variables will be related as described by B. A very
simple example would be {x1 ≤ x2}x← x+ 1 ∼ x← x+ 1{x1 ≤ x2}. This means that is the
variable x in the left program is smaller-equal than in right one, and both programs increase
x, then x in the left program will still be smaller-equal than in the right one. As this example
shows, relational Hoare logic can express more complex relationships than simple equivalence of
two games. This makes the approach very powerful. To reason about cryptography, one needs
a variant of relational Hoare logic that supports probabilistic programs. Such a probabilistic
relational Hoare logic (pRHL) was developed for this purpose by Barthe, Grégoire, and Zanella
Béguelin [4]. Both CertiCrypt [4] and its popular successor EasyCrypt use pRHL for proving
the relationship between cryptographic games.
Verifying quantum cryptography using qRHL. If we wish to follow the EasyCrypt ap-
proach to verify security proofs of quantum cryptographic schemes (be it actual quantum proto-
cols, or merely post-quantum secure schemes that withstand quantum attacks), we cannot use
pRHL but need a logic that allows us to reason about quantum programs, i.e., programs that
can operate on quantum data. Such a logic was proposed in [28], namely quantum relational
Hoare logic (qRHL). Inspired by qPRHL, this logic allows us to write judgments of the form
{A}c∼ d{B} which mean, informally, that if the predicate A is satisfied by a pair of quantum
memories M1,M2, and we execute the quantum programs c,d on those memories, then M1,M2
satisfy B afterwards. Since the quantum memories do not contain classical values, the predicates
A,B are not predicates in the classical sense. We will make this more formal later, for now it is
sufficient to understand that those predicate can express conditions both about the classical and
quantum variables in the memories M1,M2, analogously to what is done in qRHL. (E.g., state
that they are equal.)
It was argued in [28] that qRHL is suitable for reasoning about cryptography in the quantum
setting. To demonstrate this, they developed a tool for computer-aided verification of proofs
in qRHL (called the qrhl-tool henceforth), and did several example verifications, such as a
verification of quantum teleportation and one of the post-quantum security of a very simple en-
cryption scheme. However, those were toy examples only, and did not shed light on the scalability
of the approach. To resolve this issue, [25] attempted formal computer-aided verification of a
non-trivial post-quantum cryptographic proof of a state-of-the-art construction of an encryption
scheme (a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [10] analyzed in [13]). This verification was
performed using the qrhl-tool. The upshot of that case study was that, in principle, qRHL is
suitable for analyzing more complex cryptographic schemes, but several limitations were identi-
fied. One of them concerned the absence of support for local variables in qRHL. It turned out
that without support for local variables, formalizing the whole proof was at least very difficult.1
1Changes in one subproof tended to need a refactoring of most other subproofs (affecting the variables the
other subproofs talked about). And this refactoring then required new changes in other subproofs. It was not
clear whether this process would end eventually (without the additions to the logic introduced in the present
work). On the other hand, seen separately, each subproof seemed easy to finish. (Which is why the toy examples
from [28] did not uncover this difficulty.)
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These difficulties prompted the developments in the present paper, both theoretical ones and
extensions of qrhl-tool (which in turn were used to finish the proofs in [25]).
Local variables. We first explain the reasons why [28] did not include local variables in the
definition of the languages. By a local variable we mean a variable such that any changes of their
values are limited to a specific scope. That is, a read/write operation on a local variable has no
observable effect outside the scope of the local variable. At a first glance, it may seem that it
is easily possible to simulate local variables even if the language does not have builtin support
for them. Namely, any procedure or program fragment that is supposed to use a local variable
can use a global variable instead, as long as we ensure that no such “pseudo-local” variable is
used in more than one program fragment.2 While this approach is less convenient than having
built-in support for local variables, it would seem sufficient at least for handling small programs.
(In the case study [25], the programs tend to be a few dozen lines at most, even including the
subprocedures they invoke.) For this reason, qRHL as defined in [28] (and thus also qrhl-tool)
did not include support for local variables in order to keep the language and logic simple.
However, as the case study [25] revealed, this argument is not correct when quantum variables
are involved. (It probably works well for classical programs, i.e., for pRHL.) To understand why,
we first look at an extremely simple example how reasoning with pseudo-local variables would
work with classical programs (i.e., in pRHL). Say x is a global variable and y is a pseudo-local
variable (i.e., that is never accessed by other programs). Let c1 := d1 := (y ← f(x)) be a
program that assigned a function of x to y.. We want to express in pRHL that the two programs
have the same observable behavior. We express this as {x1 = x2}c1 ∼ d1{x1 = x2}, i.e., if x is
the same before execution of c1 or d1, x is the same afterwards. (This is very trivial since c1 = d1,
but as we will see, in the quantum setting, even this seemingly trivial case leads to problems.)
One way to prove this is to show that {x1 = x2}c1 ∼ d1{(x1,y1) = (x2,y2)} holds (we do not
need to include y1,y2 in the precondition since y is overwritten in both programs), and then use
the fact that (x1,y1) = (x2,y2) =⇒ x1 = x2 to conclude {x1 = x2}c1 ∼ d1{x1 = x2}.
Now consider an analogous example involving quantum variables. Say q is a global quantum
variable and r is pseudo-local. Let c2 := d2 := (r
q
← |0〉; apply U to qr). (That is, r is initial-
ized with a fixed state |0〉, and then the unitary U is jointly applied to q, r. E.g., U could be a
CNOT.) Again, we want to show that c and d have the same observable behavior (given access
only to q). This can be expressed in qRHL {q1 ≡quant q2}c2 ∼ d2{q1 ≡quant q2}. Here ≡quant is
the quantum equality introduced in [28], intuitively it expresses that two variables (or two tuples
of variables) have the same value. We try to follow the same approach as in the classical case. Us-
ing the reasoning rules from [28], it is easy to show that {q1 ≡quant q2}c2 ∼ d2{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}
holds. Then, if q1r1 ≡quant q2r2 (meaning that qr in memory M1 jointly are equal in content
to qr in M2) would imply q1 ≡quant q2, we could conclude {q1 ≡quant q2}c2 ∼ d2{q1 ≡quant q2}
Unfortunately, the quantum equality is more peculiar than the classical one. q1r1 ≡quant q2r2
is not the same as q1 ≡quant q2 ∩ r1 ≡quant r2 (intersection ∩ is the analogue of conjuction ∧
for quantum predicates) and does not imply q1 ≡quant q2.
3 This is because a quantum equality
Q1 ≡quant Q2 not only implies that Q1 and Q2 have the same content but that also that Q1 and
Q2 are not entangled with any other variables. Thus q1 ≡quant q2 would imply that q1,q2 are
not entangled with anything else but that is not implied by q1r1 ≡quant q2r2 (and in fact does
not even hold after running c,d).
2For example, we could adopt a disciplined naming strategy that prefixes local variables with the names of
the procedures they are used in, and to initialize all local variables before use. This would make sure that local
variables are never accessed outside their intended scopes. (In the presence of recursion this would not work
because recursive invocations would access the same variables at the same time. But the language of qRHL does
not support recursion anyway.)
3The converse holds: q1 ≡quant q2 ∩ r1 ≡quant r2 implies q1r1 ≡quant q2r2.
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This issue means that even though r has no relevance outside of c,d, we have to carry
information about r in our postconditions. The effect of this is that local variables “spread”
through the invariants used in other parts of the proof as described previously, making it very
hard to find consistent invariants and breaking the modularity of proofs.
Can this problem be resolved? Instead of c,d as defined above, we could define them as:
c3 := d3 := (r
q
← |0〉; apply U to qr; r
q
← |0〉). (Or stated more generally, initialize any pseudo-
local variable initialized before use, overwrite it at the end of its scope.) We have that
{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}r
q
← |0〉∼ r
q
← |0〉{q1 ≡quant q2}, (1)
in other words, if we overwrite a quantum variables occurring in a quantum equality, that variable
can be removed from the quantum equality. Then {q1 ≡quant q2}c3 ∼ d3{r1 ≡quant r2} follows
immediate from {q1 ≡quant q2}c2 ∼ d2{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2} (from the previous paragraph) and (1)
by the Seq rule from [28]. Judgment (1) cannot be proven using the rules from [28].4. One of the
results of the present work is a reasoning rule JointQInitEq from which (1) is an immediate
consequence.
Proving rule JointQInitEq would probably be enough to have rudimentary support for
pseudo-local variables (when following all the guidelines mentioned above about keeping names
separate, and initializing and overwriting). However, it seems quite inconvenient to do so in a
larger project. Furthermore, if local variables are not explicitly declared as such, they will show
up in, e.g., the set of free variables of a program. For example, the Adversary rule from [28]
allows us to reason about program fragments as a black box (i.e., without needing to look at their
concrete implementation, more about that later) but it depends on the set of free variables of a
program. Since the rule would not recognize that some of the free variables are pseudo-local, the
pseudo-local variables would creep back into the pre-/postconditions produced by the adversary
rule.
In light of those challenges, it seems that for making qRHL and qrhl-tool usable for larger
projects, built-in support for local variables is a high priority. This is what we set out to do in
the present work.
1.1 Our contribution
We add local variables to the programming language underlying qRHL and prove sound reasoning
rules to work with local variables. Furthermore, we extend the qrhl-tool to support reasoning
with local variables. In more detail:
• We extend the language by a construct for declaring local variables (Sections 3.1 and 3.2).
If v is a variable (classical or quantum) and c is a program containing variable v, then
local v; c is the program where v is local. That is, the value of v is saved before executing
c and restored afterwards. (Of course, if v is quantum, storing does not mean making a
copy.)
Based on this, we derive a number of laws for denotational equivalence of programs
involving local (such as invariance under α-renaming, commutativity of nested local-
statements, moving of local-statements, adding/removing initializations of local variables,
etc.). Closely related, we also introduce some laws concerning the initialization of variables
(e.g., when an initialization has no effect because the variable is overwritten). The latter
laws are not directly related to local variables but turn out to come up over and over while
deriving our theory of local variables. (Section 5)
4At least it is not obvious which rules to use. We have no formal proof that it does not follow from a nontrivial
combination of the rules there.
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• Basic reasoning rules for qRHL statements: We provide sound reasoning rules for qRHL
for remove local variable declarations and to rename variables. We need to remove local
variable declarations to be able to break down a qRHL judgment into judgments about
more elementary programs. E.g., we show judgments of the form {A}c1; c2 ∼ d1;d2{C} by
by showing judgments {A}c1 ∼ d1{B} and {B}c1 ∼ d1{C} and then using the Seq rule. To
do the same with a goal of the form {A}local v; c1; c2 ∼ local v;d1;d2{C} we first need
to remove the local-declaration, last but not least because we may want to refer to v in B.
Very roughly speaking, the rule says that to prove {A}local v; c1; c2 ∼ local v;d1;d2{C}
it is sufficient to prove {A}c1; c2 ∼ d1;d2{C}. (Interestingly, the converse does not hold.)
These rules are given in Section 6.
• As explained above, the rules of qRHL from [28] do not allow us to derive that
{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}r
q
← |0〉∼ r
q
← |0〉{q1 ≡quant q2}. (2)
That is, we cannot get rid of variables that occur in a quantum equality, even if these
variables are overwritten (which is essentially the same as erasing them). This is because
the rules for quantum initialization in [28] (QInit1/2) are one-sided rules. That means
they consider only an initialization (e.g., r
q
← |0〉) in the left or the right program but
not both simultaneously. To derive (2), though, we need a rule that operates on both
initializations simultaneously (intuitively, to make sure the entanglement between q and
r is handled in a synchronized fashion on the left and right side.5 We prove such a rule
(JointQInitEq).
As a consequence, we also prove a two-sided rule for removing local variables from
qRHL judgments (JointRemoveLocal). Put simply, we show that to show a judg-
ment such as {q1 ≡quant q2}local r; c ∼ local r;d{q1 ≡quant q2}, it is sufficient to show
{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}c∼ d{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}. The fact that r is included in the quantum
equality (with the one-sided rules RemoveLocal1/2 it would not be) makes this judg-
ment easier to prove. {q1 ≡quant q2}c∼ d{q1 ≡quant q2} would only be provable if c,d do
not create any entanglement between q and r.
The rule JointRemoveLocal in turn is crucial in the derivation of the Adversary rule
(see below).
As a simple corollary of JointQInitEq, we also get a strengthening of the QrhlElimEq
rule from [28] that allows us to relate qRHL judgments and (in)equalities of probabilities
involving programs, we call the new rule QrhlElimEqNew.
(The three new rules are presented in Section 7.)
• Variable changing: The contributions described above already go a long way towards mak-
ing it possible to work with local variables in qRHL proofs. However, we still cannot have
modular proofs (in the sense that one part of the proof does not have to depend on which
local variables occur in another part of the proof). Consider the following example: Say,
we want to prove a qRHL judgment of the form
{q1 ≡quant q2}local r; c0; c∼ local r; c0;d{q1 ≡quant q2}. (3)
5The need for two-sided rules is not a new observation. Even in the classical pRHL [4], we have a two-sided
rule for probabilistic sampling that “synchronizes” the random choices on the left and right side. This rule cannot
be emulated using two applications of the one-sided rule for samplings. Similarly, qRHL [28] has a two-sided rule
for measurements, synchronizing the measurement outcomes. However, for assignments, there is no two-sided
rule in pRHL because there seems to be nothing that this rule could achieve that cannot be achieved with two
consecutive applications of the one-sided rule. Thus it comes as a bit of a surprise that the quantum analogue to
an assignment does need a two-sided rule.
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Say the programs c,d are complex subroutines that we wish to handle in a different sub-
proof. Since c0 might entangle q and r, proving (3), we might end up having to prove
the subgoal X := {q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}c ∼ d{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}. This breaks the modu-
larity of the overall proof because now our analysis of c,d needs to know which local
variables (namely, r) are used in a different part of the overall proof (namely, the anal-
ysis of local r; c0; c and local r; c0;d). Even worse, if c,d appear in different place
where different local variables are used, we may have to prove several different variants
of X , all differing only in which local variable(s) are included in the quantum equal-
ity. What we want to do it to prove a single theorem about c,d not mentioning r, say
X0 := {q1 ≡quant q2}c∼ d{q1 ≡quant q2}, and to be able to derive X from it whenever
needed. Unfortunately, we do not know whether X0 implies X . However, we do prove a
rule (EqVarChange, Section 8) that allows us to derive X from a theorem of the form
X1 := {q1qaux ,1 ≡quant q2qaux ,2}c∼ d{q1qaux ,1 ≡quant q2qaux ,2} where qaux is an auxil-
iary variable that is never used anywhere. (Basically, X1 says that equality is preserved
even in a larger context.) It might seem as if we can derive X from X1 simply by renaming
qaux into r (using our rules for renaming variables), but that is not possible because qaux
and r might not have the same type. Requiring qaux and r to have the same type would
break the modularity of the proof again, and furthermore there might be more than just
one local variable, while our theorem X1 always uses the same single auxiliary variable
qaux .
The rule EqVarChange is also crucial in the derivation of the Adversary rule (see
below).
• Adversary rule: Proofs in qRHL (and in other Hoare logics) are often performed by
deriving a judgment about the whole program from judgements about the individ-
ual statements in that program. However, in a cryptographic context, this is not al-
ways possible. We often need to reason about unknown fragments of code, namely
whenever we reason about the behavior of an adversary attacking the cryptographic
scheme. (From a logical perspective, an adversary is simply a program whose precise
code is not known.) Of course, if we do not know the code of a program c, we can-
not say much about the pre- and postconditions. However, what we do now is, in-
formally, that if the same program c is used on the left and right side, and the vari-
ables of both instances of c have the same value, then both instances will behave the
same. That is, {Q1 ≡quant Q2}c ∼ c{Q1 ≡quant Q2} if Q contains all free variables of
c. Or, in a more general situation, we have {Q1 ≡quant Q2}C[s]∼ C[s
′]{Q1 ≡quant Q2}
if {Q1 ≡quant Q2}s∼ s
′{Q1 ≡quant Q2}. This would be used in a situation where the ad-
versary is represented by an unknown context C, and that invokes some known procedure
s (or s′), e.g., s, s′ might be some real/fake encryption oracle. And since s, s′ are known,
we can manually prove {Q1 ≡quant Q2}s∼ s
′{Q1 ≡quant Q2}.
Situations like the examples above (where unknown but identical code occurs on both
sides) are handled by an adversary rule. In the classical setting, an adversary rule was
already introduced in pRHL [4]. Also in qRHL [28], we have an adversary rule Adversary.
However, the rule presented there has several drawbacks in our setting:
– In the presence of local variables, its proof does not apply any more. This is because
the proof is by induction over the structure of the adversary/context C. But the
introduction of local variables means that there is another case that would need to
be covered in the induction (namely, C = local v;C′). Dealing with local variables
makes the rule and the induction more complex because we need to make sure the
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rule correctly handles cases where a variable of s is local in C (and thus also local in
C[s]).
– The adversary rule from [28] requires the quantum equality
Q1 ≡quant Q2 to be the same in the precondition and postcondi-
tion of {Q1 ≡quant Q2}C[s] ∼ C[s
′]{Q1 ≡quant Q2}, and in the subgoal
{Q1 ≡quant Q2}s∼ s
′{Q1 ≡quant Q2}. However, this is unnecessarily restrictive.
E.g., if C has local variables, those might occur in the subgoal but not in the
pre-/postcondition. Or if C initializes certain variables before use, then they can be
omitted from the precondition but not from the postcondition.
We present a new rule Adversary that solves the these problems. Our rule is considerably
more fine-grained than the original rule in that allows us to include different variable
sets in pre-/postconditions and subgoals, and that it takes into account various kinds of
overwritten, local, and read-only variables.
The proof of the adversary rule relies in particular on the rules JointRemoveLocal and
EqVarChange to maintain the induction hypothesis even below local-statements.
• New/rewritten tactics: In theory, all we need in order to do proofs in qRHL are the
rules introduced above and in [28]. In practice, however, manually doing proofs is too
cumbersome and error-prone. Instead, [28] introduced the qrhl-tool that allows to develop
and check qRHL proofs interactively on the computer. To use the new rules we introduce
in this work, we implemented a number of new tactics: rename for renaming variables
(page 32), local remove for removing local variables (page 32),6 local up for moving
local variables to the top of a program (page 30), conseq qrhl for changing variables in a
quantum equality using rule EqVarChange (page 40), equal implementing the adversary
rule (page 45, this tactic existed before but we completely rewrote it based on our new
Adversary rule). We also strengthened the tactic byqrhl that introduces qRHL subgoals
in the first place, using the new rule QrhlElimEqNew (page 39).
In this paper, we only briefly sketch what those tactics do. For details, see the user manual
of qrhl-tool, version 0.5.
Some of the results in this paper are shown in Isabelle/HOL [16]. This concerns especially
results which involve inductions with many side conditions (such proofs are particular error
prone when done by hand). Those proofs are not proofs from first princples and/or based on
the semantics of the language. For this, we would need developments in operator theory that
are not yet available in Isabelle/HOL. Instead, we axiomatize the language and semantics, and
base all proofs on an explicit list of axioms in the file Assumptions.thy. Those are either facts
shown in [28], in manual proofs in this paper, or that are elementary. This approach gives us a
good trade-off – avoiding errors in proofs that involve many technical conditions, but at the same
time avoiding the extreme effort of formalizing everything in Isabelle/HOL. The Isabelle/HOL
formalization consists of 4315 lines of code. The Isabelle theory files for Isabelle/HOL (version
Isabelle-2020) are available here [24].
2 Preliminaries
We introduce the notation used in this work. See also the symbol index at the end of this paper.
6We have not implemented the two-sided removal via rule JointRemoveLocal, but that rule is implicitly
present in the adversary rule.
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Variables. A program variable x (short: variable) is an identifier annotated with a s et
Typex 6= ∅, and with a flag that determined whether the variable is quantum or classical.
(In our semantics, for classical variables x the type Typex will be the set of all values a classical
variable can store. Quantum variables q can store superpositions of values in Typeq.)
We will usually denote classical variables with x,y and quantum variables with q . Given
a set V of variables, we write V cl for the classical variables in V and V qu for the quantum
variables in V .
Given a set V of variables, we write TypesetV for the set of all functions f on V with f(x) ∈
Typex for all x ∈ V . (I.e., the dependent product Type
set
V =
∏
x∈V Typex.)
Intuitively, TypesetV is the set of all memories that assign a classical value to each variable
in V .
Given a list V = (x1, . . . ,xn) of variables, Type
list
V := Typex1 × · · · × Typexn . Note that if
V is a list with distinct elements, and V ′ is the set of those elements, then TypelistV and Type
set
V ′
are still not the same set, but their elements can be identified canonically. Roughly speaking,
for a list V , the components of m ∈ TypelistV are indexed by natural numbers (and are therefore
independent of the names of the variables in V ), while for a set V , the components ofm ∈ TypesetV
are indexed by variable names.
Given disjoint sets V,W of variables, we write VW for the union (instead of V ∪W).
Expressions (i.e., formulas that depend on some classical variables X) e are always assumed
to have finitely many variables fv(e). If m is an assignment of values to classical variables, we
write JeKm for e evaluated on m. We write Type
exp
e for the type of e, i.e., the set of all possible
values of e.
An important concept in the formalization of qRHL are indexed variables, i.e., for every
variable v there are two distinct variables v1,v2. In [28], there are explicit operations idx1, idx2
that replace all variables by indexed variables in a list/set of variables or in an expression. We
use a more compact notation and simply index the list/set/expression. I.e., if V is a list/set of
variables, V1 refers to V with every variable v replaced by v1. And e1 is the expression e with
every v substituted by v1. (In [28] this would be idx1 V, idx1 e.) Similarly, given a quantum
predicate A (defined later in Section 4), A1 and A2 are quantum predicates with all variables v
replaced by v1,v2, respectively.
Let Vall be the set of all variables (not including indexed variables).
We make some assumptions about the set Vall of all variables. (Those assumptions were
not made in [28].) Namely, for any variable v ∈ Vall, there exist infinitely many w ∈ Vall
that are compatible with v. (I.e. v and w are either both quantum or both classical, and
Typev = Typew.) Furthermore, we assume that there is at least one quantum variable q with
|Typeq| = ℵ0. (Note, we only assume that those variables exist, not that they are actually used
in any given program.)
Linear algebra. We write ℓ2(X) for the Hilbert space with basis {|x〉}x∈X . For a set of
quantum variables Q, we write ℓ2[Q] for ℓ2(TypesetQ ), i.e., the space of all states those quantum
variables can take.
Given a vector ψ, we define proj(ψ) := ψψ∗. Given a bounded operator A, we define
toE(A) (ρ) := AρA∗.
A cq-operator is a positive trace-class operator over a set V of variables of the form∑
m proj(|m〉Vcl) ⊗ ρm for positive trace-class operators ρm over V
qu. I.e., a cq-operator is
basically a density operator that is classical in the classical variables of Vqu (except that we do
not require that the trace is = 1 or ≤ 1).
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A superoperator is a completely positive map E that maps trace-class operators to trace-class
operators such that ∃B.∀ρ. tr E(ρ) ≤ B tr ρ.
Subspaces always mean topologically closed subspaces. For a subspace A, let A⊥ be the
orthogonal complement.
CPTPM means completely positive trace preserving map, while CPTRM means completely
positive trace reducing map (i.e., for positive input, the trace of the output is smaller-equal the
trace of the input).
For disjoint R,S ⊆ Q, let SWAPR↔S be the unitary operator on ℓ
2[Q] that swap the
subsystems R and S.
Let suppA denote the support of an operator A. (Formally, the image of the smallest
projector P such that PAP = A.)
For R ⊆ Q and a trace-class operator over ℓ2[Q], let trR ρ denote the partial trace of ρ that
traces out R. That is, trRρ is a trace-class operator over ℓ
2[Q \R]. Sometimes, we annotate trR
with the set of remaining variables, i.e., tr[S]R if S = Q \R. If Q consists of indexed variables,
we write tr 1 short for trQ1 where Q1 ⊆ Q consists only of the 1-indexed variables. Analogously
tr 2.
For a bounded operator A, let A∗ denote the adjoint of A. (I.e., the conjugate transpose,
often also written A†.)
[28] also explicitly writes the canonical isomorphisms Uvars,Q between different isomorphic
spaces related to the variables Q. (Namely ℓ2[Q] and ℓ2(TypesetQ ).) We omit those isomorphisms
in our notation. In particular, if ψ ∈ ℓ2[Q], and A ⊆ ℓ2[Q1], then the expression ψ ∈ A is
well-typed and understood to mean U∗vars,Q1Uvars,Qψ ∈ ℓ
2[Q2].
Distributions. Probability distributions are always discrete distributions (i.e., the σ-algebra
of all measurable spaces is the powerset). A subprobability distribution is like a probability
distribution except that the total probability may be ≤ 1. For a (sub)probability distribution µ
over X , let supp µ ⊆ X be the support of X , i.e., the set of values with nonzero probability. For
a (sub)probability distribution µ over X×Y , let marginal1(µ) , marginal2(µ) be the first/second
marginal (i.e., (sub)probability distributions over X and Y , respectively).
3 Language of programs
3.1 Syntax
We recap the syntax from [28], and add one more statement to it, for declaring local variables.
Everything else is unchanged.
We will typically denote programs with c or d .
Quantum variables are written q, r , classical variables x,y , an arbitrary variables v,w .
Sets/lists of variables are Q,R,S or X,Y or V,W.
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c,d := skip (no operation)
X← e (classical assignment)
X
$
← e (classical sampling)
if e then c else d (conditional)
while e do c (loop)
c;d (sequential composition)
Q
q
← e (initialization of quantum registers)
apply e to Q (quantum application)
X←measure Q with e (measurement)
local v; c (local variables)
In the sampling statement, e evaluates to a distribution. In the initialization of quantum
registers, e evaluates to a pure quantum state, q1 . . .qn are jointly initialized to that state.
In the quantum application, e evaluates to an isometry that is applied to q1 . . .qn. In the
measurement, e evaluates to a projective measurement, the outcome is stored in x. (Recall that
an expression e can be an arbitrarily complex mathematical formula in the classical variables.
So, e.g., an expression that describes an isometry could be something as simple as just H (here
H denotes the Hadamard transform), or something more complex such as, e.g., Hx, meaning H
is applied if x = 1.)
The new statement in this syntax (relative to [28]) is local v; c. Intuitively, this means that v
is a local variable in c. More specifically (but still informally), at the beginning of local v; c, the
current state of v is stored (think of a stack), v is initialized with a default value, c is executed,
and the original state of v is restored.
Note that local v; c binds weaker than c;d. I.e., local v; c; c means local v; (c;d), not
(local v;d); c.
A program is well-typed according to the following rules:
• X← e is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ Type
list
X ,
• X
$
← e is well-typed iff Typeexpe is a subset of the subprobability distributions on Type
list
X .
• if e then c else d is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ {true, false} and c,d are well-typed.
• while e do c is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ {true, false} and c is well-typed.
• c;d is well-typed iff c and d are well-typed.
• Q
q
← e is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ ℓ
2(TypelistQ ), and ‖ψ‖ = 1 for all ψ ∈ Type
exp
e .
• apply e to Q is well-typed iff Typeexpe is a subset of the set of isometries on ℓ
2(TypelistQ ).
• X ← measure Q with e is well-typed iff Typeexpe is a subset of the set of all projective
measurements on TypelistQ with outcomes in Type
list
X .
• local v; c is well-typed iff c is well-typed.
In this paper, we will only consider well-typed programs. That is, “program” implicitly means
“well-typed program”, and all derivation rules hold under the implicit assumption that the pro-
grams in premises and conclusions are well-typed.
We also consider contexts in this work. A context follows the above grammar, with the addi-
tional symbol i where i is a natural number. A context C can be instantiated as C[c1, . . . , cn],
This means that every occurrence of i is replaced by ci. (With no special treatment of local-
variables. E.g., if C = local v;1, then C[c] = local v; c even if c contains v.)
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3.2 Semantics of programs
First, we recap the semantics of the language as defined in [28].
Given a program c (with fv(c) ⊆ V), we define its semantics JcK as a cq-superoperator that
maps trace-class cq-operators over V onto trace-class cq-operators over V. In the following,
let ρ be a trace-class cq-operator over V, m ∈ TypesetVcl (i.e., an assignment of values to classical
variables), and ρm a positive trace-class operator overV
qu. Note that specifying JcK on operators
of the form proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm specifies JcK on all ρ, since ρ can be written as an infinite sum of
proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm.
Then the semantics of the language were defined as follows in [28]:
JskipK(ρ) := ρ
Jx← eK
(
proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm
)
:= proj(|m(x := JeKm)〉Vcl)⊗ ρm
Jx
$
← eK
(
proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm
)
:=
∑
z∈Typex
JeKm(z) · proj
(
|m(x := z)〉Vcl
)
⊗ ρm
Jif e then c else dK(ρ) := JcK(↓e(ρ)) + JdK(↓¬e(ρ))
Jwhile e do cK(ρ) :=
∞∑
i=0
↓¬e
(
(JcK ◦ ↓e)
i(ρ)
)
Jc1; c2K := Jc2K ◦ Jc1K
JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm
)
:= proj
(
|m〉Vcl
)
⊗ trQρm ⊗ proj
(
JeKm
)
Japply e to QK
(
proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm
)
:= proj
(
|m〉Vcl
)
⊗ JeKmρm(JeKm)
∗
Jx←measure Q with eK
(
proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ ρm
)
:=
∑
z∈Typex
proj
(
|m(x := z)〉Vcl
)
⊗ (JeKm(z))ρm(JeKm(z))
Here ↓e (ρ) is the cq-density operator ρ restricted to the parts where the expression e holds.
Formally, ↓e is the cq-superoperator on V such that
↓e(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) :=
{
proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm (JeKm = true)
0 (otherwise)
Local variables. It remains to give semantics to statements of the form local v; c as these
did not occur in [28].
For every variable v, we assume a fixed element •v ∈ Typev (the default value). Let ρ
•
v :=
proj
(
|•v〉v
)
.
In the following definition, for any variable v, let v′ denote another (so far unused) variable
of the same type, with the same default value, and v′ is quantum/classical iff v is. Then, for
any superoperator E ,
Localv
[
E
]
(ρ) := trv toE(SWAPv↔v′) ◦
(
E ⊗ idv′
)
◦ toE(SWAPv↔v′)(ρ⊗ ρ
•
v) (4)
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v′
E
Localv[E]
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Or equivalently:
Localv[c] := F⊗idv where F(ρ) := trvE(ρ⊗ρ
•
v) for all trace-class operators ρ over V
all \ v
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v
E
Localv[E]
And then we can define Jlocal v; cK = Localv
[
JcK
]
.
We write c
d
= d to denote denotational equivalence, i.e., JcK = JdK.
Given the semantics, we can define the probability that a certain condition holds after exe-
cution of a program, using the following definition from [28]:
Definition 1
Fix a program c, an expression e with Typeexpe = {true, false}, and some trace-class
cq-operator ρ over Vall. Then Pr[e : c(ρ)] :=
∑
m s.t. JeKm=true
tr ρm where JcK(ρ) =:∑
m proj(|m〉)⊗ ρm for trace-class operators ρm over (V
all)qu.
3.3 Variable sets
Given a context (or program) C, we define a number of sets of variables such as the set of
free variables. These will be used throughout the paper in various rules, most crucially in the
Adversary rule. Those sets are:
• fv (C) : All free variables in C.
• inner(C) : All variables v such that C contains a hole under a local v. (Those are the
variables that will be shadowed if we substitute a program into a hole of C.)
• covered(C) : All variables v such every hole is under a local v. (Those are the variables
which, if a program that is substituted into a hole of C contains them, will still not be
visible outside C.)
• overwr (C) : All variables that are overwritten in C. I.e., written before they are used for
the first time. (Thus the content of those variables before execution of C does not matter.)
• written(C) : All variables that are written (i.e., classical variables on the lhs of an assign-
ment or sampling, and all free quantum variables).
The precise recursive definitions follow. All those variables sets are also formally defined in
Isabelle/HOL in the theory Basic_Definitions.
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fv(i) := ∅
fv(X← e) := X ∪ fv(e)
fv(X
$
← e) := X ∪ fv(e)
fv(local v;C) := fv (C) \ {v}
fv(Q
q
← e) := Q ∪ fv (e)
fv(apply Q to e) := Q ∪ fv (e)
fv(X←measure Q with e) := Q ∪X ∪ fv(e)
fv(C;C′) := fv (C) ∪ fv (C′)
fv(if e then C else C′) := fv (e) ∪ fv(C) ∪ fv (C′)
fv(while e do C) := fv (e) ∪ fv(C)
fv(skip) := ∅
inner(i) := ∅
inner(C) := ∅ (if C is a program)
inner(local v;C) := inner(C) ∪ {v} (if C is not a program)
inner(if e then C else C′) := inner(C) ∪ inner(C′)
inner(while e do C) := inner(C)
inner(C;C′) := inner(C) ∪ inner(C′)
covered(i) := ∅
covered(C;C′) := covered(C) ∩ covered(C′)
covered(if e then C else C′) := covered(C) ∩ covered(C′)
covered(while e do C) := covered(C)
covered(local v;C) := covered(C) ∪ {v}
covered(C) := Vall (if C is a program)
14
overwr (i) := ∅
overwr (X← e) := X \ fv(e)
overwr (X
$
← e) := X \ fv(e)
overwr (Q
q
← e) := Q
overwr (apply Q to e) := ∅
overwr (X←measure Q with e) := X \ fv(e)
overwr (if e then C else C′) := (overwr (C) ∩ overwr (C′)) \ fv (e)
overwr (while e do C) := ∅
overwr (local v;C) := overwr (C) \ {v}
overwr (C;C′) := overwr (C) ∪
((
overwr (C′) \ fv (C)
)
∩ covered(C)
)
overwr (skip) := ∅
written(i) := ∅
written(X← e) := X
written(X
$
← e) := X
written(local v;C) := written(C) \ {v}
written(Q
q
← e) := Q
written(apply Q to e) := Q
written(X←measure Q with e) := X ∪Q
written(if e then C else C′) := written(C) ∪ written(C′)
written(while e do C) := written(C)
written(skip) := ∅
written(C;C′) := written(C) ∪ written(C′)
3.4 Substitutions
A variable substitution σ is a function from variables to variables such that v and σ(v) are
compatible, i.e. v and σ(v) are either both quantum or both classical, and Typev = Typeσ(v).
Given a variable substitution v and a program/context c, cσ denotes the result of replacing
every non-local variable v in c by σ(v). In contrast, c !σ replaces every variable v by σ(v). (E.g.,
if σ(v) = w, then (v ← 1; local v;v ← 1)σ = (w← 1; local v;v ← 1) but (v ← 1; local v;v ←
1) !σ = (w← 1; local w;w← 1).)
Renaming variables using a substitution may lead to conflicts with existing local variables.
The following inductive predicate noconflict(·, ·) ensures that this does not happen.
noconflict(σ, c) noconflict(σ,d)
noconflict(σ, if e then c else d)
noconflict(σ, c) noconflict(σ,d)
noconflict(σ, c;d)
noconflict(σ, c)
noconflict(σ,while e do c) noconflict(σ,X← e) noconflict(σ,X
$
← e)
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noconflict(σ,Q
q
← e) noconflict(σ, apply Q to e)
noconflict(σ,X←measure Q with e) noconflict(σ, skip)
noconflict(σ(v := v), c) v /∈ σ(fv (c) ∩ domσ)
noconflict(σ, local v; c)
Here domσ := {v : σ(v) 6= v}.
In the Isabelle theories, the substitution cσ is formalized as Basic_Definitions.subst_vars,
the substitution c !σ as Basic_Definitions.full_subst_vars, and noconflict(σ, c) as
Basic_Definitions.no_conflict.
4 Quantum relational Hoare logic
In this section, we recap the relevant definitions of qRHL from [28]. We slightly rewrite the
definitions to make them compatible with our notational conventions.
A quantum predicate A over variables V is, formally, an expression with variables in Vcl that
evaluates to a subspace of ℓ2[Vqu]. Intuitively, a memory (with classical and quantum variables)
statisfies A iff the quantum part of the memory lies in A, when we instantiate the variables of
A with the classical variables of the memory. For pre-/postconditions in qRHL we use quantum
predicates over Vall1 V
all
2 . If such a memory is represented as a density operator ρ, we say “ρ
satisfies A” if this holds. A formal definition is given in [27, Definition 14]. Following [26], we
only consider quantum predicates that depend on a finite number of variables, then fv (A) , the
set of free classical and quantum variables of A, is well-defined (see [26] for details).
For detailed discussion of quantum predicates, we refer to [28]. Here we only recall the most
important constructions of quantum predicates:
Intersection ∩ of quantum predicates is the analogue of conjuction ∧ of classical predicates.
Sum + of spaces is the analogue to disjunction ∨. A ⊆ B intuitively means that A implies B.
(Note that A ⊆ B is not a quantum predicate, just a mathematical proposition.)
Given a classical predicate P (i.e., a Boolean formula depending only on classical variables),
we can construct a quantum predicate Cla[P ] . Cla[P ] is defined to be the whole space is P
is true, and to be the 0-space if P is false. This way, a state ρ satisfies Cla[P ] if the classical
variables of ρ satisfy P .
Furthermore, [28] introduces the notation S»Q to denote the predicate that encodes the fact
that Q has a value in Q (S must be a subspace of ℓ2[Q]). A»Q can also be used for operators A
to emphasize that A operates on ℓ2[Q]. And A÷ ψ is an operation specific to the QInit1 rule,
we omit the definition here. See [28] for details. We write Q =q ψ to mean span {ψ}»Q, i.e.,
the quantum predicate that says that Q is in state ψ.
Quantum equality. One very important quantum predicate (that can be combined with other
predicates, e.g., using ∩ and +) is the quantum equality. If Q,R are disjoint lists of quantum
variables, then Q ≡quant R intuitively means that Q and R have the same content. Formally,
Q ≡quant R is the space of all vectors that are invariant under SWAPQ↔R, i.e., the unitary that
swaps registers Q and R in a quantum state. Intuitively, this makes sense: two variables have
the same content if exchanging them does not change the overall state of the system. Though
not formally required, Q will always contain 1-indexed variables, and R will contain 2-indexed
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variables (or vice versa). That way, we can use a quantum equality in a pre-/postcondition in a
qRHL judgment to state that the quantum variables of two programs are “equal”. For example
q1r1 ≡quant q2r2 means that q, r jointly have the same content in the left and right memory.
There is an extended form of the quantum equality, UQ ≡quant VR where U, V are unitaries
(or more generally, bounded operators, but then the intuitive meaning of the quantum equality
gets lots). Intuitively, UQ ≡quant VR means that the variables in Q, when we apply U , have the
same content as the variables in R, when we apply V . For example id q1r1 ≡quant CNOTq2r2
means that qr on the left is what you get from qr on the right after a CNOT. We refer to [27,
Definition 27] for the formal definition.
An important fact about the quantum equality is that QQ′ ≡quant RR
′ is not equivalent to
Q ≡quant R ∩Q
′ ≡quant R
′, we merely have Q ≡quant R ∩Q
′ ≡quant R
′ ⊆ Q ≡quant R ∩Q
′ ≡quant
R′. This makes it harder to work with the quantum equality than the classical equality. For
useful laws about the quantum equality, see [28].
qRHL judgments. In qRHL, we want to express that given a precondition A (on a pair
of memories, i.e., a quantum predicate on Vall1 V
all
2 ), when executing the programs c,d, the
postcondition B holds, in short {A}c∼ d{B}. However, this simplified description is somewhat
misleading. We do not simply execute c,d in parallel on an initial state consisting of two
memories satisfying A and look whether the final state satisfies B. The reason is that if we
did that, even simple fact such as {Cla[true]}x
$
← U ∼ x
$
← U{Cla[x1 = x2]} would not hold
(where U is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}). This is because executing the left and right
program in parallel would only with probability 1/2 result in the same bit x. This phenomenon
already occurred in the classical setting (pRHL, [4]). Thus we use a more complex definition
that “synchronizes” probabilistic choices between the left and right program. For a detailed
justification of the definition of qRHL see [28]. We simply state it here:
Definition 2: Quantum relational Hoare judgments
Let c,d be programs. Let A,B be quantum predicates over Vall1 V
all
2 .
Then {A}c∼ d{B} holds iff for all separable ρ that satisfy A, we have that there exists
a separable ρ′ that satisfies B such that tr2ρ
′ = JcK
(
tr2ρ
)
and tr1ρ
′ = JdK
(
tr1ρ
)
.
4.1 Rules of qRHL
Most rules proven in [28] still hold (with the same proof) in our setting (even though the definition
of the language has changed). This is because the proof of these rules are “semantic”. By this, we
mean that, if a program c is all-quantified in a rule, the proof makes no assumptions about the
code of c, and instead only refers to its semantics JcK. Thus the exactly same proofs work when
more statements are added to the language. (But not if the definition of existing statements is
changed.) A notable exception is the Adversary rule from [28] which does not apply any more
since it is proven by induction of the structure of programs.
In Figures 1, 2, 3, we state the rules from [28] that still hold, using our more compact notation
(in particular, we omit the types of the various variables and expressions, and we omit explicitly
stated canonical isomorphisms between various spaces).7 We omit the rather lengthy rules Trans
and JointMeasure that also still hold for brevity, see [28].
7We also use Lemma 1 to justify replacing assumptions of the form “c is V-local” by “fv(c) ⊆ V”.
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Sym{
Aσ
}
d∼ c
{
Bσ
}
∀v.σ(v1) := v2, σ(v2) := v1
{A}c ∼ d{B}
Conseq
A ⊆ A′ B′ ⊆ B {A′}c∼ d{B′}
{A}c∼ d{B}
Seq
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B} {B}d1 ∼ d2{C}
{A}c1;d1 ∼ c2;d2{C}
Case
∀z.
{
Cla[e = z] ∩ A
}
c∼ d
{
B
}
{A}c∼ d{B}
Equal
fv(c) ⊆ XQ{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)
}
c∼ c
{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)
}
Frame
fv (R) ⊆ V1V
′
2 fv(c) ∩V and fv (d) ∩V
′ are classical
c is (fv(c) ∩V)-readonly d is (fv (d) ∩V′)-readonly {A}c∼ d{B}
{A ∩ R}c∼ d{B ∩ R}
QrhlElim
ρ is separable ρ satisfies A ρ1 := tr
[V1]
V2
ρ ρ2 := tr
[V2]
V1
ρ
{
A
}
c ∼ d
{
Cla[e1 ⇒ f2]
}
Pr
[
e : c(ρ1)
]
≤ Pr
[
f : d(ρ2)
] (also holds for =,⇔ and
≥,⇐ instead of ≤,⇒)
QrhlElimEq
ρ satisfies A fv (c), fv (d) ⊆ XQ
fv(A)qu ⊆ Q
{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) ∩ A1 ∩ A2
}
c ∼ d
{
Cla[e1 ⇒ f2]
}
Pr
[
e : c(ρ)
]
≤ Pr[f : d(ρ)]
(also holds for =,⇔ and
≥,⇐ instead of ≤,⇒)
TransSimple
Xp := fv (p)
cl, Qp := fv(p)
qu for p = c,d, e
{Cla[Xc1 = Xd2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qd2)}c∼ d{Cla[Xc1 = Xd2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qd2)}
{Cla[Xd1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qd1 ≡quant Qe2)}d∼ e{Cla[Xd1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qd1 ≡quant Qe2)}
{Cla[Xc1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qe2)}c ∼ e{Cla[Xc1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qe2)}
Figure 1: Rules for qRHL (general rules).
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Skip
{A}skip∼ skip{A}
Assign1{
B{e1/x1}
}
x← e ∼ skip
{
B
}
Sample1
A :=
(
Cla[e1 is total] ∩
⋂
z∈supp e1
B{z/x1}
)
{A}x
$
← e ∼ skip{B}
JointSample
A :=
(
Cla
[
marginal1(f) = e1 ∧marginal2(f) = e
′
2
]
∩
⋂
(z,z′)∈supp f
B{z/x1, z
′/y2}
)
{A}x
$
← e ∼ y
$
← e′{B}
If1{
Cla[e1] ∩ A
}
c ∼ skip
{
B
} {
Cla[¬e1] ∩ A
}
d∼ skip
{
B
}
{A}if e then c else d∼ skip{B}
JointIf
A ⊆ Cla[e1 = e
′
2]
{
Cla[e1 ∧ e
′
2] ∩ A
}
c ∼ c′
{
B
} {
Cla[¬e1 ∧ ¬e
′
2] ∩ A
}
d ∼ d′
{
B
}
{A}if e then c else d∼ if e′ then c′ else d′{B}
While1{
Cla[e1] ∩ A
}
c ∼ skip
{
A
}
A ⊆ B1 (while e do c) is total on B{
A
}
while e do c ∼ skip
{
Cla[¬e1] ∩ A
}
JointWhile
A ⊆ Cla[e1 = e
′
2] {Cla[e1 ∧ e
′
2] ∩ A}c ∼ d{A}
{A}while e do c ∼ while e′ do d{Cla[¬e1 ∧ ¬e
′
2] ∩ A}
Figure 2: Rules for qRHL (related to individual classical statements). For the rules Assign1,
Sample1, If1, and While1, there is also an analogous symmetric rule that we do not list
explicitly.
5 Semantics-related lemmas
Lemma 1
If fv (c) ⊆ V, then there is a E on V such that JcK = E ⊗ idVall\V.
(This lemma was already stated in [28] but the proof was not “semantic”.)
Proof. We show this by induction on c. Each case is elementary to check, we only show the
case c = local v; c′ here:
Since fv (c) = fv (c′) \ {v}, we have fv (c′) ⊆ V ∪ {v}. By induction hypothesis, there is an
E ′ on V ∪ {v} with Jc′K = E ′ ⊗ idVall\V\{v}.
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QInit1{
A÷ e1»Q1
}
Q
q
← e ∼ skip
{
A
} QApply1
{(e1»Q1)
∗ · (B ∩ im(e1»Q1))}apply e to Q∼ skip{B}
Measure1
A :=
(
Cla[e1 is a total measurement] ∩
⋂
z
(
(B{z/x1} ∩ im(e1(z)»Q1)) + (e1(z)»Q1)
⊥
))
{A}x←measure Q with e ∼ skip{B}
JointMeasureSimple
f1z := e1(z)»Q1 f
′
2z := e
′
2(z)»Q
′
2
A := Cla[e1 = e
′
2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q
′
2) ∩
⋂
z
(B{z/x1, z/y2} ∩ im f1z ∩ im f
′
2z) + (im f1z)
⊥ + (im f ′2z)
⊥
{A}x←measure Q with e ∼ y← measure Q′ with e′{B}
Figure 3: Rules for qRHL (related to individual quantum statements). For the rules Measure1,
QApply1, and QInit1, there is also an analogous symmetric rule that we do not list explicitly.
We have (expressing the various superoperators as circuits for readability):
JcK
(∗)
=
Vall \ V \ {v}
V \ {v}
v
|•〉v
v
Jc′K (∗∗)
=
Vall \ V \ {v}
V \ {v}
v
|•〉v
v E
′
Here (∗) is by the semantics of the language, and (∗∗) since Jc′K = E ′ ⊗ idVall\V\{v}. If v /∈ V,
let E be the dotted box in the rhs. If v ∈ V, let E be the dotted box together with the v-wire.
Then E is a superoperator on V, and JcK = E ⊗ idVall\V. 
Lemma 2
If fv (c) ∩ fv (d) = ∅, then c;d
d
= d; c.
Proof. Let V := fv (c) and W := Vall \ fv(d). By Lemma 1, there exists Ec on V such that
JcK = Ec ⊗ idW. And there exists Ed on W such that JdK = idV ⊗ Ed. Thus
Jc;dK = JdK◦JcK = (idV⊗Ed)◦(Ec⊗idW) = Ec⊗Ed = (Ec⊗idW)◦(idV⊗Ed) = JcK◦JdK = Jd; cK.

Lemma 3
(i) local v; local v; c
d
= local v; c. (And Localv
[
Localv[E ]
]
= Localv[E ].)
(ii) local v; local w; c
d
= local w; local v; c. (And Localv
[
Localw[E ]
]
=
Localw
[
Localv[E ]
]
.)
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Proof. In this proof, we show the claims in parentheses, involving Localv[E ] etc. The claims
involving local v etc. are an immediate consequence.
(We show only the claims in terms of local v; . . .. The claims in terms of Localv[. . .] are
shown analogously.)
By definition of Localv[. . .],Localw[. . .], the lhs and rhs of (i) are described by the following
circuits:
Vall \ {v}
v
|•〉v
v
|•〉v
v
E
JLocalv [Localv[E]]K
JLocalv [E]K
and
Vall \ {v}
v
|•〉v
v
E
JLocalv[E]K
The only difference is the third wire in the lhs which is initialized with |•〉v and then discarded
again, is the same as the identity. Thus the lhs and rhs are equal, (i) follows.
By definition of the semantics of the language, the lhs and rhs of (ii) are described by the
following circuits:
Vall \ {v,w}
v
w
|•〉v
v
|•〉w
w
E
JLocalw [E]K
JLocalv [Localw[E]]K
and
Vall \ {v,w}
v
w
|•〉w
w
|•〉v
v E
JLocalv[E]K
JLocalw [Localv[E]]K
The only difference is the order in which the last two wires are drawn which has no semantic
meaning. Thus the lhs and rhs are equal, (ii) follows. 
This lemma implies that the order in which variables are declared local does not matter.
This motivates the following shorthand: For a finite V we introduce the following shorthand:
(local V; c) := (local v1; . . . ; local vn; c) where v1, . . . ,vn are the elements of V in arbitrary
order.
Similarly, we define LocalV[E ] := Localv1 [Localv2 [. . .Localvn [E ]]].
As an immediate consequence of the definition and Lemma 3 (ii), we get
Lemma 4
(i) local ∅; c = c. (Also Local∅[E ] = E .)
(ii) local V; local V′; c
d
= local V ∪V′; c. (Also LocalV
[
LocalV′ [E ]
]
= LocalV∪V′ [E ].)
(iii) Jlocal V; cK = LocalV
[
JcK
]
.
Lemma 5
Let I be a set and Ei (i ∈ I) be superoperators. Assume that
∑
i∈I Ei converges. Then∑
i∈I LocalV[Ei] = LocalV[
∑
i∈I Ei] (and the lhs converges).
a Here convergence is pointwise
convergence with respect to the trace-norm.
aNote that the converse does not hold: If
∑
i∈I LocalV[Ei] converges,
∑
i∈I Ei does not necessarily con-
verge. For example, let Ei(ρ) := proj(ψ)ρproj(ψ) where ψ is a normalized vector orthogonal to |•〉V. Then
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LocalV[Ei] = 0 and thus
∑
i∈I LocalV[Ei] converges trivially. But
∑
i∈I Ei(proj(ψ)) =
∑
i∈I proj(ψ) di-
verges (assuming I is infinite), and thus
∑
i∈I Ei does not converge pointwise.
Proof. In this proof, unless mentioned otherwise, convergence of trace-class operators is with
respect to trace-norm, and convergence of superoperators is pointwise with respect to trace-
norm. Whenever we write an equality, we mean that equality holds whenever the sums in lhs
and rhs converge, and that the lhs converges if the rhs does.
Claim 1
∑
i(Ei ⊗ id) = (
∑
i Ei)⊗ id .
Proof of claim. Let L′ :=
∑
i∈I Ei. By assumption, L
′ exists and is trace bounded.
Let B such that trL′(ρ) ≤ B tr ρ for all positive ρ. For finite F and positive ρ, we
have
∑
i∈F tr(Ei ⊗ id)(ρ) =
∑
i∈F Ei(tr2ρ) ≤ L
′(tr2ρ). Thus the sum
∑
i∈F tr(Ei ⊗ id)(ρ)
is bounded (as a function of finite F ). Furthermore, since Ei is completely positive,
(Ei ⊗ id)(ρ) is positive. Thus
∑
i∈F (Ei ⊗ id)(ρ) is bounded and increasing, hence it
converges. Thus the limit L′′(ρ) :=
∑
i∈I(Ei ⊗ id)(ρ) exists for positive ρ. Since every
trace class ρ is a linear combination of four positive ρ, the limit also exists for arbitrary ρ.
We are left to show that (L′ ⊗ id) = L′′. Assume this is not the case. Since the set
of all trace class operators is spanned by operators σ ⊗ τ with unit trace, this implies
that there are σ, τ with unit trace such that (L′ ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ) 6= L′′(σ ⊗ τ). Let δ :=
‖(L′ ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ)− L′′(σ ⊗ τ)‖tr. Since L
′(σ) is the limit of
∑
i Ei(σ), for sufficiently
large finite F , ∥∥∥∑
i∈F
Ei(σ)− L
′(σ)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ δ/3. (5)
And since L′′(σ ⊗ τ) is the limit of
∑
i(Ei ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ), for sufficiently large finite F ,∥∥∥∑
i∈F
(Ei ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ) − L
′′(σ ⊗ τ)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ δ/3. (6)
Fix an F such that both (5) and (6) hold.
Furthermore,∥∥∥∑
i∈F
Ei(σ) − L
′(σ)
∥∥∥
tr
=
∥∥∥(∑
i∈F
Ei(σ) − L
′(σ)
)
⊗ τ
∥∥∥
tr
=
∥∥∥∑
i∈F
(Ei ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ)− (L
′ ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ)
∥∥∥
tr
.
With (5), this implies∥∥∥∑
i∈F
(Ei ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ)− (L
′ ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ δ/3.
With (6) and the triangle inequality, we get ‖(L′ ⊗ id)(σ ⊗ τ)− L′′(σ ⊗ τ)‖ ≤ 2δ/3, in
contradiction to the definition of δ. Thus (L′ ⊗ id) = L′′. ⋄
Claim 2
∑
i Localv[Ei] = Localv[
∑
i Ei].
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(Note: the index of Localv[. . .] is a single variable v, not V.)
Proof of claim. We have:∑
i
Localv[Ei](ρ)
(4)
=
∑
i
trv
(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)
((
Ei ⊗ idv′
)(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)(ρ⊗ ρ
•
v)
)))
(∗)
= trv
(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)
(∑
i
(
Ei ⊗ idv′
)(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)(ρ⊗ ρ
•
v)
)))
(∗∗)
= trv
(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)
((∑
i
(Ei ⊗ idv′)
)(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)(ρ⊗ ρ
•
v)
)))
Cl. 1
= trv
(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)
((
(
∑
i Ei)⊗ idv′
)(
toE(SWAPv↔v′)(ρ⊗ ρ
•
v)
)))
(4)
= Localv
[∑
i Ei
]
Here each equality means that the lhs converges if the rhs converges. And (∗) follows
because trv and toE(SWAPv↔v′) are trace-preserving. And (∗∗) follows by definition of
pointwise convergence. ⋄
The lemma follows by induction over V with Claim 2. 
For simpler notation, we write init v for v
q
← |•v〉 or v ← •v, depending on whether v is
quantum or classical. For a finite set V, let init V denote init v1; . . . ; init vn where v1, . . . ,vn
are the elements of V in some arbitrary order. (The order does not matter due to Lemma 2.)
Lemma 6
For finite V = {v1, . . . ,vn}, let E
init
V be the superoperator ρ 7→ proj(|•〉V) ⊗ tr ρ, where
|•〉V := |•〉v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |•〉vn .
Then Jinit VK = E initV ⊗ idVall\V.
Proof. For V = {q} or V = {x}, this follows from the definition of init q and init x, as well as
the semantics of assignment and quantum initialization. By definition of E initV , E
init
V ⊗ idVall\V⊗
E initW ⊗ idVall\W = E
init
VW ⊗ idVall\VW. The lemma then follows by induction. 
Lemma 7
(i) local V; c
d
= c if V ∩ fv(c) = ∅.
(ii) local V; c
d
= local V; (init V′; c) if V′ ⊆ V.
(iii) local V; c
d
= local V; (c; init V′) if V′ ⊆ V.
Proof. We first show (i). By Lemma 1, there is an E on fv (c) such that JcK = E ⊗ idVall\fv(c).
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Thus we can represent JcK and Jlocal V; cK by the following circuits:
Vall \ fv(c) \ V
fv(c)
V
E
JcK
and
Vall \ fv(c) \ V
fv(c)
V
|•〉V V
E
JcK
Jlocal V; cK
The only difference is the third wire that is created and discarded on the rhs. This is equal to
the identity, thus the two circuits are identical and we have c
d
= local V; c. This shows (i).
We now show (ii). We show the special case local v; c
d
= local v; (init v; c). The general
case follows by induction. The lhs and rhs, as circuits are, respectively:
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v
JcK
Jlocal v; cK
and
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v E initv
Jinit vK
JcK
Jlocal v; (init v; c)K
Here we used Lemma 6 for expressing Jinit vK in terms of E initv .
It follows immediately from the definition of E initv that E
init
v (proj(|•〉v)) = proj(|•〉v). Thus
the two circuits compute the same function. Hence local v; c
d
= local v; (init v; c). (ii) follows.
We now show (iii). We show the special case local v; c
d
= local v; (c; init v). The general
case follows by induction. The lhs and rhs, as circuits are, respectively:
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v
JcK
Jlocal v; cK
and
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v
JcK
E initv
Jinit vK
Jlocal v; (c; init v)K
Here we used Lemma 6 for expressing Jinit vK in terms of E initv .
Since E initv is trace-preserving, tr◦E
init
v = tr. I.e., E
init
v and compute the same function.
Thus the lhs and rhs compute the same function, i.e., local c;
d
= local v; (c; init v). (iii) follows.

Lemma 8
Let σ be a bijective variable substitution. Assume domσ ∩ fv (c) = ∅. Then c !σ
d
= c.
Proof. Let Uσ be the unitary on ℓ
2[Vall] defined by Uσ|m〉= |m ◦ σ〉. That is Uσ reorders the
subsystems corresponding to the variables in Vall. Let Eσ(ρ) := UσρU
∗
σ .
Since c !σ simply renames all variables (even the local ones), Jc !σK simply operates on the
reordered variables, formally Jc !σK(ρ) = Eσ−1 ◦ JcK ◦ Eσ.
Since σ is the identity on domσ, Eσ = E
′
σ ⊗ id for some E
′
σ on domσ. And JcK = E
′
c⊗ id for
some E ′c on fv (c). Since domσ and fv(c) are disjoint, this implies that Eσ and JcK commute.
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Thus
Jc !σK(ρ) = Eσ−1 ◦ JcK ◦ Eσ = Eσ−1 ◦ Eσ ◦ JcK = Eσ◦σ−1 ◦ JcK = Eid ◦ JcK = JcK. 
Lemma 9
Let σ be a variable substitution that is injective on V and let W := σ(V). Assume that
σ = id outside V and that (fv (c) \V) ∩W = ∅. Assume noconflict(σ, c).
Then local V; c
d
= local W; (c{W/V})
This is shown in Isabelle/HOL, as rename_locals in theory Rename_Locals.thy. See
Section 1.1 for remarks about our Isabelle/HOL development.
Lemma 10
(i) (local V; c); (local V;d)
d
= local V; (c; init V;d).
(ii) If V ∩ fv(c) = ∅, then c; (local V;d)
d
= local V; (c;d).
Proof. We first show (i) in the special caseV = v. The lhs and rhs are depicted by the following
circuits (using Lemma 6 for the semantics of init v):
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v
JcK
Jlocal v; cK
|•〉v
v
JdK
Jlocal v;dK
Vall \ v
v
|•〉v
v
JcK
E initv
JdK
Jc; init v;dK
By definition (Lemma 6), E initv : ρ 7→ proj(|•〉v) ⊗ tr ρ. Or, as a circuit,
v |•〉v . Thus the
two circuits are identical, hence (i) follows.
We prove (ii) in the special case V = v:
c; (local v;d)
(∗)
d
= (local v; c); (local v;d)
(i)
d
= local v; (c; init v;d)
(∗∗)
d
= local v; (init v; c;d)
(∗∗∗)
d
= local v; (c;d)
Here (∗) uses Lemma 7 (i), (∗∗) uses Lemma 2, and (∗∗∗) uses Lemma 7 (ii).
This shows (ii).
The general case of (ii) is a straightforward induction over V, using the special
case for the induction step. We did the proof of the general case in Isabelle/HOL
(Helping_Lemmas.locals_seq2), using the special of (ii) as an axiom.
The general case of (i) is proven by a simple induction over V, using the special case of
(i) and the general case of (i) for the base case. We did the proof of the general case in
Isabelle/HOL (Helping_Lemmas.locals_seq_merge), using the special of (i) as an axiom. 
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Lemma 11
(i) If X ⊆ overwr (c), then X← e; c
d
= c.
(ii) If Q ⊆ overwr(c), then Q
q
← e; c
d
= c.
(iii) If V ⊆ overwr (c), then init V; c
d
= c.
Proof. We first show a special case of (iii), namely that init v; c
d
= c if v ∈ overwr (c). We
show this by induction over the structure of c.
We distinguish the following cases:
• Cases c = skip, c = while e do c′, c = apply e to Q:
In these cases, overwr (c) = ∅. By assumption, v ∈ overwr (c). Thus this case cannot
arise.
• Case c = X← e:
In this case, v ∈ overwr (c) = X \ fv(e). Thus v is a classical variable, v ∈ X, and
v /∈ fv(e).
We have for all m, ρ:
Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JX← eK ◦ Jv ← •vK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of ;, def. of init)
= JX← eK
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of assignment)
= proj(|m(v := •v)(X := JeKm(v:=•v))〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ (sem. of assignment)
(∗)
= proj(|m(v := •v)(X := JeKm)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
(∗∗)
= proj(|m(X := JeKm)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
= JX← eK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of assignment)
Here (∗) follows since v /∈ fv(e) and thus JeKm(v:=•v) = JeKm. And (∗∗) follows since
v ∈ X and thus m(v := •v)(X := JeKm) = m(X := JeKm).
Thus Jinit v; cK = JcK on all states of the form proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ. Since states of this
form span all cq-states, by linearity, init v; c
d
= c.
• Case c = X
$
← e:
In this case, v ∈ overwr (c) = X \ fv(e). Thus v is a classical variable, v ∈ X, and
v /∈ fv(e).
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We have for all m, ρ:
Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JX
$
← eK ◦ Jv ← •vK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of ;, def. of init)
= JX
$
← eK
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of assignment)
=
∑
z
JeKm(v:=•v)(z) · proj(|m(v := •v)(X := z)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ (sem. of sample)
(∗)
=
∑
z
JeKm(z) · proj(|m(v := •v)(X := z)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
(∗∗)
=
∑
z
JeKm(z) · proj(|m(X := z)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
= JX
$
← eK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of assignment)
Here (∗) follows since v /∈ fv(e) and thus JeKm(v:=•v) = JeKm. And (∗∗) follows since
v ∈ X and thus m(v := •v)(X := JeKm) = m(X := JeKm).
Thus Jinit v; cK = JcK on all states of the form proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ. By linearity, init v; c
d
=
c.
• Case c = Q
q
← e:
In this case, v ∈ overwr (c) = Q. Thus v is a quantum variable and v ∈ Q. We have for
all m, ρ:
Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉)⊗ ρ
)
= JQ
q
← eK ◦ Jinit vK
(
proj(|m〉)⊗ ρ
)
(def. of c, semantics of ;)
= JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m〉)⊗ tr[v]ρ⊗ proj(|•〉v)
)
(Lemma 6)
= proj(|m〉)⊗ trQ
(
trvρ⊗ proj(|•〉v)
)
⊗ JeKm (sem. of quant. init.)
= proj(|m〉)⊗ trQρ⊗ JeKm (v ∈ Q)
= JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m〉)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of quant. init.)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉)⊗ ρ
)
(definition of c)
Thus Jinit v; cK = JcK on all states of the form proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ. By linearity, init v; c
d
=
c.
• Case c = if e then c′ else d′:
Since v ∈ overwr (c) = (overwr (c′) ∩ overwr (d′)) \ fv(e) we have: v ∈ overwr (c′), v ∈
overwr (d′), v /∈ fv (e).
We will show that Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
for all m, ρ.
By linearity, this then shows init v; c
d
= c. Fix m, ρ. We assume JeKm = true. The case
JeKm = false is shown analogously.
We distinguish two cases, depending on whether v is a classical or a quantum variable:
– Case v is classical:
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Since v /∈ fv (e), we have
JeKm(v:=•v) = JeKm = true (7)
And
Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= Jif e then c′ else d′K ◦ Jv ← •vK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of ;, def. of init)
= Jif e then c′ else d′K
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of assignment)
= Jc′K ◦ ↓e
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7)
= proj(|m(v:=•v)〉
Vall
cl)⊗ρ
+Jd′K ◦ ↓¬e
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7)
= 0 (sem. of if)
= Jc′K
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)
= Jinit v; c′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem., def. of init)
= Jc′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(induction hypothesis)
= Jif e then c′ else d′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of if, (7))
– Case v is quantum:
Let ρ′ := trQρ⊗ proj(JeKm). We have
Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= Jif e then c′ else d′K ◦ Jv
q
← |•〉vK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of ;, def. of init)
= Jif e then c′ else d′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ′
)
(sem. of qu. init.)
= Jc′K ◦ ↓e
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ′
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ρ′
+Jd′K ◦ ↓¬e
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ′
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
(sem. of if)
= Jc′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ′
)
= Jinit v; c′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ′
)
(sem., def. of init)
= Jc′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ′
)
(induction hypothesis)
= Jif e then c′ else d′K
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of if, (7))
• Case c = c′;d′:
We have v ∈ overwr (c) = overwr (c′) ∪
((
overwr (d′) \ fv(c′)
)
∩ covered(c′)
)
. We thus
distinguish the following cases:
– Case v ∈ overwr (c′):
By induction hypothesis, init v; c′
d
= c′. Thus init v; c
d
= init v; c′;d′
d
= c′;d′ = c.
– Case v ∈ overwr (d′) \ fv (c′):
Since v /∈ fv(c′) and fv(init v) = {v}, we have init v; c′
d
= c′; init v by Lemma 2.
And since v ∈ overwr (d′), by induction hypothesis, we have init v;d′
d
= d′. Thus
init v; c
d
= init v; c′;d′
d
= c′; init v;d′
d
= c′;d′ = c.
• Case c = X←measure Q with e:
Since v ∈ overwr(c) = X \ fv(e), we have that v is classical, v ∈ X, but v /∈ fv (e).
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We will show that Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
for all m, ρ.
By linearity, this then shows init v; c
d
= c. Fix m, ρ.
Let Pz := JeKm(z) ⊗ idVallqu\Q. Since v /∈ fv(e), we also have Pz = JeKm(v:=•v)(z) ⊗
idVallqu\Q
We have for all m, ρ:
Jinit v; cK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
= JX←measure Q with eK ◦ Jv ← •vK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of ;, def. of init)
= JX←measure Q with eK
(
proj(|m(v := •v)〉Vallcl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of assignment)
=
∑
z
proj(|m(v := •v)(X := z)〉Vallcl)⊗ PzρPz (sem. of measurement)
(∗)
=
∑
z
proj(|m(X := z)〉
Vall
cl)⊗ PzρPz
= JX←measure Q with eK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
(sem. of measurement)
= JcK
(
proj(|m〉
Vall
cl)⊗ ρ
)
Here (∗) follows since v ∈ X and thus m(v := •v)(X := z) = m(X := z).
• Case c = local w; c′:
Since v ∈ overwr (c) = overwr (c′) \ {w}, we have v ∈ overwr (c′) but v 6= w. By induc-
tion hypothesis, we have init v; c′
d
= c′. By Lemma 10 (ii), we have init v; local w; c′
d
=
local w; init v; c′. Thus init v; c
d
= init v; local w; c′
d
= local w; init v; c′
d
=
local w; c′ = c.
Thus we have shown:
init v; c
d
= c if v ∈ overwr (c). (8)
From this we can conclude (iii): Let {v1, . . . ,vn} := V ⊆ overwr (c).
init V; c
d
= init v1; . . . ; init vn; c
d
= init v1; . . . ; init vn−1; c
d
= . . .
d
= c.
This shows (iii).
We show (i). It is easy to check from the semantics that X← e; init X
d
= init X. Thus
X← e; c
(iii)
d
= X← e; init X; c
d
= init X; c
(iii)
d
= c.
Finally, we show (ii). It is easy to check from the semantics that Q ← e; init Q
d
= init Q.
Thus
Q
q
← e; c
(iii)
d
= Q
q
← e; init Q; c
d
= init Q; c
(iii)
d
= c. 
Lemma 12
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(i) For c := (local V1; c1); . . . ; (local Vn; cn), we have c
d
= local V↑; (c′1; . . . ; c
′
n) where
c′i := init V
∗
i ; local V
↓
i ; ci,W1 := V
↑, Wi+1 := Wi∪V
∗
i −(fv(ci)−V
↓
i ),Vi−V
↓
i−Wi ⊆
V∗i ⊆ V
↑, V↓i ⊆ Vi ⊆ V
↓
i ∪V
↑, V↑ ∩ fv (c) = ∅.a
(ii) Assume V↑ ∪ V↓then ⊇ Vthen ⊇ V
↓
then , V
↑ ∪ V↓else ⊇ Velse ⊇ V
↓
else , V
↑ ∩ fv (e) = ∅,
V↑ ∩ (fv (cthen) \Vthen) = ∅, V
↑ ∩ (fv(celse) \Velse) = ∅.
b Then
if e then {local Vthen ; cthen} else {local Velse ; celse}
d
= local V↑; if e then {local V↓then ; cthen} else {local V
↓
else ; celse}
(iii) Assume V↑ ⊆ V \ fv (e) and V↓ := V \V↑.c Then
while e do {local V; c}
d
= local V↑;while e do {local V↓; init V↑; c}
aThe greedy instantiation is V↑ :=
(⋃
i
Vi
)
− fv(c), V↓
i
:= Vi −V↑, V∗i := Vi −V
↓
i
−Wi.
bThe greedy instantiation is V↑ := (Vthen ∪Velse)\
(
fv(cthen ) \Vthen
)
\
(
fv(celse ) \Velse
)
\ fv(e), V↓
then
:=
Vthen \V
↑ V↓
else
:= Velse \V
↑.
cThe greedy instantiation is V↑ := V \ fv(e).
This lemma allows us to move local variable declarations upwards in a program without
changing its semantics. We have implemented a tactic local up in qrhl-tool that allows us
to move all or selected local variables upwards as far as possible. This is done by repeatedly
applying Lemma 12 repeatedly as long as possible. In the footnotes in Lemma 12, we describe
how the tactic instantiates the lemma (we call this the “greedy instantiation”) in order to move
as many variables as possible.
Proof. (i) is shown in Isabelle/HOL, as locals_up_block in theory Locals_Up_Block.thy.
See Section 1.1 for remarks about our Isabelle/HOL development.
We now show (ii). By definition, Jif e then cthen else delseK = Jcthen K ◦ ↓e + JdelseK ◦ ↓¬e.
Let de,d¬e be arbitrary programs with JdeK = ↓e, Jd¬eK = ↓¬e and fv(de), fv (d¬e) = fv(e).
a
Then
Jif e then cthen else delseK = Jde; cthenK + Jd¬e; celseK for any cthen , celse . (9)
Thus
Jif e then (local Vthen ; cthen) else (local Velse ; celse)K
(9)
= Jde; local Vthen ; cthenK + Jd¬e; local Velse ; celseK
(i)
= Jlocal V↑; (de; local V
↓
then ; cthen)K + Jlocal V
↑;d¬e; local V
↓
else ; celseK
Lem. 4 (iii)
= LocalV↑
[
Jde; local V
↓
then ; cthenK
]
+ LocalV↑
[
Jd¬e; local V
↓
else ; celseK
]
Lem. 5
= LocalV↑
[
Jde; local V
↓
then ; cthenK
]
+ Jd¬e; local V
↓
else ; celseK
(9)
= LocalV↑
[
Jif e then (local V↓then ; cthen) else (local V
↓
else ; celse)K
]
Lem. 4 (iii)
= Jlocal V↑; if e then (local V↓then ; cthen) else (local V
↓
else ; celse)K.
In this calculation,
(i)
= uses two invocations of (i), one to convert each of the summands. The
first invocation is instantiated with c := de; local Vthen ; cthen , c1 := de, c2 := cthen , V1 := ∅,
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V2 := Vthen , V
↓
1 := ∅, V
↓
2 := V
↓
then , V
∗
1 ,V
∗
2 := ∅, V
↑ := V↑, W1 := V
↑, W2 := V
↑ \ fv(e).
The premises of (i) then follow from the premises of (ii) (using also that fv (de) = fv (e) and
fv (de; local Vthen ; cthen) = fv(e) ∪ (fv (cthen) \Vthen). The second invocation is instantiated
analogously, with else instead of then, and with c1 := d¬e.
This shows (ii).
We now show (iii).
By definition, Jwhile e do cK =
∑∞
i=0 ↓¬e ◦ (JcK ◦ ↓e)
i. (Convergence is pointwise with
respect to the trace-norm.) Let de,d¬e be arbitrary programs with JdeK = ↓e, Jd¬eK = ↓¬e and
fv (de), fv(d¬e) = fv (e). Then
Jwhile e do cK =
∞∑
i=0
Jde; c; . . . ;de; c︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
;d¬eK for any c (10)
From (i), we have
de; (local V; c); . . . ;de; (local V; c);d¬e
d
= local V↑; (de; (init V
↑; local V↓; c); . . . ;de; (init V
↑; local V↓; c);d¬e︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:c∗i
) (11)
Specifically, we instantiate (i) as follows:
c1, . . . , c2n+1 := de, c, de, c, . . . , de, c, d¬e
c′1, . . . , c
′
2n+1 := de, (init V
↑;local V↓;c), de, (init V↑;local V↓;c), . . . , de, (init V↑;local V↓;c), d¬e
V1, . . .V2n+1 := ∅, V, ∅, V, . . . , ∅, V, ∅
V∗1 , . . .V
∗
2n+1 := ∅, V
↑, ∅, V↑, . . . , ∅, V↑, ∅
V
↓
1 , . . .V
↓
2n+1 := ∅, V
↓, ∅, V↓, . . . , ∅, V↓, ∅
As well as V↑ := V↑. (The values of Wi do not matter in this appli-
cation of (i).) Then the premises of (i) are elementary to check (using also
fv (de; (local V; c); . . . ;de; (local V; c);d¬e) = fv(e) ∪ (fv (c) \ V) and the premises V
↑ ⊆
V \ fv (e) and V↓ = V \V↑). (11) follows.
And from (10), we have
while e do (init V↑; local V↓; c)
d
=
∞∑
i=0
Jc∗i K. (12)
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This implies:
Jwhile e do (local V; c)K
(10),(11)
=
∞∑
i=0
Jlocal V↑; c∗i K =
∞∑
i=0
LocalV↑
[
Jc∗i K
]
Lem. 5
= LocalV↑
[ ∞∑
i=0
Jc∗i K
]
(12)
= LocalV↑
[
Jwhile e do (init V↑; local V↓; c)K
]
= Jlocal V↑;while e do (init V↑; local V↓; c)K
Lem. 10 (ii)
= Jlocal V↑;while e do (local V↓; (init V↑; c))K.
This shows (iii). 
aE.g., de := if e then halt else skip, d¬e := if e then skip else halt, halt := while true do skip.
6 Basic rules for variable renaming/removal
RenameQrhl1
noconflict(σ, c) σ injective on fv (c) ∪ {v : v1 ∈ fv(A) ∪ fv (B)} {Aσ1}cσ ∼ c{Bσ1}
{A}c∼ d{B}
Here σ1(v1) := w1 whenever σ(v) = w (and σ1(v2) := v2 for all v).
Analogously RenameQrhl2 for renaming in d.
This is shown in Isabelle/HOL, as rename_qrhl_left and rename_qrhl_right in theory
Rename_Locals.thy. See Section 1.1 for remarks about our Isabelle/HOL development.
We have implemented a tactic rename in qrhl-tool that implements this rule.
RemoveLocal1
fv (A), fv (B) ∩V1 = ∅
{
A ∩ (V1 =q |•〉V)
}
c ∼ d
{
B
}
{A}local V; c ∼ d{B}
Analogously RemoveLocal2 for removing on the right side.
Note that the converse of this rule does not hold: If {A}local V; c ∼ d{B}, then we do not
necessarily have
{
A ∩ (V1 =q |•〉V)
}
c∼ d
{
B
}
.8
We have implemented this rule as the tactic local remove in qrhl-tool which allows us to
remove selected (or all) local variable declarations from the top of the left or right program. The
tactic is a little weaker in that it does not include V1 =q |•〉V in the precondition of the new
subgoal.
Proof. We show the rule for V = v (only one variable). The general case follows by induction.
Let w ∈ Vall be an arbitrary variable such that w1 /∈ fv (A,B), w /∈ fv(c), |Typew| ≥
|Typev|, |Typew| = ∞.
a Then |Typesetv′w| = |Type
set
vw| = |Typew|. Hence there is a bijection
φ : Typew → Type
set
v′w. Thus U : |x〉w 7→ |φ(x)〉v′w is a unitary from ℓ
2[w] to ℓ2[v′w].
Since w /∈ fv (c), by Lemma 1, JcK = E ⊗ idw for some E on V
all \ w. In slight abuse of
8Counterexample: Let c := (qr
q
← 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉), d := (x
$
← {0, 1}) (here {0, 1} stands for the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}), A := Cla[true], B := (q1 =q |x2〉). Then {A ∩ (q1 =q |•〉q)}c ∼ d{B} does not hold (this
would imply that q is unentangled with r after c). Yet local r; c is equivalent to assigning randomly |0〉 or |1〉 to
q, thus {A}local y; c∼ d{B} holds.
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notation, we also write JcK for that E .
Since v,w /∈ fv(A), fv (B), there are A′,B′ such that A = A′ ⊗ ℓ2[vw] and B = B′ ⊗ ℓ2[vw].
Consider the following circuit (but ignore the wavy lines with boxes on the bottom for now):
Vall \ vw
v
w
ρ(1)
A =
A′ ⊗ ℓ2[v1w1]
|•〉v′
v′
ρ(2)
A′ ⊗ ℓ2[v1w1]
⊗ span|•〉v′1
ρ(3)
A′ ⊗ span|•〉v1
⊗ ℓ2[v′
1
w1]
U∗
w
ρ(4)
A′ ⊗ span|•〉v1 ⊗ ℓ
2[w1]
= A ∩ (v1 =q |•〉v1 )
JcK
ρ(5)
B =
B′ ⊗ ℓ2[v1w1]
U
v′
ρ(6)
B′ ⊗ ℓ2[v1v′1w1]
ρ(7)
B′ ⊗ ℓ2[v1v′1w1]
ρ(8)
B =
B′ ⊗ ℓ2[v1w1]
Vall \ vw
v
w
First, not that U commutes with JcK. And since U is unitary, U∗ and U are inverses. Thus U∗
and U cancel out in this circuit. The remaining circuit is by definition Jlocal v; cK (see (4)).
Abbreviating, we say “ρ1, ρ2 satisfy A” iff there exists a separable ρ (the “coupling”) such
that tr2ρ = ρ1, tr1ρ = ρ2, and ρ satisfies A.
We need to show {A}local v; c ∼ d{B}. For this, fix cq-operators ρ1, ρ2 onV
all satisfying A.
We need to show that Jlocal v; cK(ρ1), JdK(ρ2) satisfy B.
Let ρ(1), . . . , ρ(8) be the states at the corresponding wavy lines when executing the above
circuit with initial state ρ1. In particular, ρ
(1) = ρ1 and ρ
(8) = Jlocal v; cK(ρ1). Let C
(i) denote
the predicate given in the box under the wavy line for ρ(i).
Since ρ1, ρ2 satisfy A, we have that ρ
(1), ρ2 satisfy C
(1).
Then ρ(2), ρ2 satisfy C
(2). (The coupling is ρ⊗ proj(|•〉v′1) if the previous coupling was ρ.)
Then ρ(3), ρ2 satisfy C
(3). (The coupling is (toE(SWAPv↔v′)⊗ id)ρ if the previous coupling
was ρ.)
Then ρ(4), ρ2 satisfy C
(4) since U∗ maps ℓ2[v′1w1] to ℓ
2[w1]. (The coupling is (toE(U
∗)⊗id )ρ
if the previous coupling was ρ.)
By assumption,
{
A ∩ (v1 =q |•〉v1)
}
c ∼ d
{
B
}
. And since ρ(4), ρ2 satisfy C
(4) = A ∩ (v1 =q
|•〉v1), we have that JcK(ρ
(4)), JdK(ρ2) satisfy B = C
(5). Since ρ(5) = JcK(ρ(4)), we have that
ρ(5), JdK(ρ2) satisfy C
(5).
Then ρ(6), JdK(ρ2) satisfy C
(6) since U maps ℓ2[w1] to ℓ
2[v′1w1]. (The coupling is (toE(U)⊗
id)ρ if the previous coupling was ρ.)
Then ρ(7), JdK(ρ2) satisfy C
(7). (The coupling is (toE(SWAPv↔v′) ⊗ id)ρ if the previous
coupling was ρ.)
Then ρ(8), JdK(ρ2) satisfy C
(8). (The coupling is trv′ρ if the previous coupling was ρ.)
As mentioned above, ρ(8) = Jlocal v; cK(ρ1). And C
(8) = B. Thus Jlocal v; cK(ρ1), JdK(ρ2)
satisfy B.
This shows {A}local v; c ∼ d{B}. 
aSuch w exists because there are infinitely many w with Typew = Typev and infinitely many w with
Typew =∞, and fv(A), fv(B), fv(c) are finite (see preliminaries).
7 Two-sided initialization
33
JointQInitEq
fv (B) ∩Q1Q
′
2 = ∅
A′ := B ∩
(
(V ⊗ U)R1Q1 ≡quant (V
′ ⊗ U ′)R′2Q
′
2
)
∩ Cla[U,U ′, V, V ′ are isometries]
B′ := B ∩ (VR1 ≡quant V
′R′2) ∩ span|e1〉Q1 ∩ span|e
′
2〉Q′2{
A′
}
Q
q
← e ∼ Q′
q
← e′
{
B′
}
The following simple case is probably easier to understand at first reading. We obtain it by
setting U,U ′, V, V ′ := id and weakening the postcondition.
JointQInitEq0
fv (B) ∩Q1Q
′
2 = ∅{
B ∩
(
R1Q1 ≡quant R
′
2Q
′
2
)}
Q
q
← e ∼ Q′
q
← e′
{
B ∩ (R1 ≡quant R
′
2)
}
Proof of JointQInitEq. By [27, Lemma 36], it is sufficient to show that for all
m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with normalized ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA
′Km1m2 , there is a separable state ρ
′ with
tr[1]ρ′ = JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m1〉⊗ ψ1)
)
and tr[2]ρ′ = JQ′
q
← e′K
(
proj(|m2〉⊗ ψ2)
)
and ρ′ satis-
fies B′.
Since in the following proof, we will use the same m1,m2 throughout, for ease of notation,
we will simply write A′ instead of JA′Km1m2 , and analogously for all other expressions (e.g.,
B, UQ, e, e
′, etc.)
Since (V ⊗ U)R1Q1 ≡quant (V
′ ⊗ U ′)R′2Q
′
2 ⊇ A
′, we have ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ (V ⊗ U)R1Q1 ≡quant
(V ′ ⊗ U ′)R′2Q
′
2. Since Cla[U,U
′, V, V ′ are isometries] ⊇ A′, we have that that U,U ′, V, V ′ are
isometries.
By [27, Lemma 29], this implies that there are normalized ψQR1 , ψ
E
1 , ψ
QR
2 , ψ
E
2 on Q1R1,
Vall1 \ Q1R1, Q
′
2R
′
2, V
all
2 \ Q
′
2R
′
2 such that: ψ1 = ψ
QR
1 ⊗ ψ
E
1 and ψ2 = ψ
QR
2 ⊗ ψ
E
2 and
(U ⊗ V )ψQR1 = (U
′ ⊗ V ′)ψQR2 .
Let {φz}z∈Z be an orthonormal basis of imU ∩ imU
′. Then U∗φz are orthonormal, and
U ′∗φz are orthonormal.
Let ψ1z := (proj(U
∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
1 ⊗ ψ
E
1 and ψ2z := (proj(U
′∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
2 ⊗ ψ
E
2 .
Note that (proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
1 is of the form U
∗φz ⊗ ψ
R
1z for some (not necessarily nor-
malized) ψR1z. And similarly (proj(U
′∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
2 = U
′∗φz ⊗ψ
R
2z for some ψ
R
2z. We fix those
ψR1z and ψ
R
2z.
Let
ψ′z := e1⊗ψ
R
1z⊗ψ
E
1 ⊗e
′
2⊗ψ
R
2z⊗ψ
E
2 ·
1
‖ψR1z‖
2
and ρ′ :=
∑
z
proj(|m1〉⊗ |m2〉⊗ ψ
′
z). (13)
(Note that e1, e
′
2 are normalized vectors on Q1,Q
′
2, respectively because we assume that the
programs in the rule are well-typed.)
Claim 3 For all z, ‖ψR1z‖ = ‖ψ
R
2z‖ and V ψ
R
1z = V
′ψR2z.
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Proof of claim. Then
(U ⊗ V )(proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
1
(∗)
= (U ⊗ V )(proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)(U
∗U ⊗ id)ψQR1
= (proj(UU∗φz)⊗ id)(U ⊗ V )ψ
QR
1
(∗∗)
= (proj(φz)⊗ id)(U ⊗ V )ψ
QR
1
(∗∗∗)
= (proj(φz)⊗ id)(U
′ ⊗ V ′)ψQR2
(∗∗)
= (proj(U ′U ′∗φz)⊗ id)(U
′ ⊗ V ′)ψQR2
= (U ′ ⊗ V ′)(proj(U ′∗φz)⊗ id)(U
′∗U ′ ⊗ id)ψQR1
(∗)
= (U ′ ⊗ V ′)(proj(U ′∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
2 .
(14)
Here (∗) uses that U,U ′ are isometries. And (∗∗) uses that ψz ∈ imU ∩ imU
′. And (∗∗∗)
uses that (U ⊗ V )ψQR1 = (U
′ ⊗ V ′)ψQR2 (this was shown above). Then
‖ψR1z‖
(∗)
= ‖U∗φz ⊗ ψ
R
1z‖
(∗∗)
=
∥∥(proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)ψQR1 ∥∥ (∗∗∗)= ∥∥(U ⊗ V )(proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)ψQR1 ∥∥
Here (∗) uses that U∗φz is normalized. And (∗∗) is by definition of ψ
R
1z. And (∗∗∗) uses
that U, V are isometries. Analogously, ‖ψR2z‖ =
∥∥(U ′ ⊗ V ′)(proj(U ′∗φz)⊗ id)ψQR2 ∥∥. By
(14), this implies ‖ψR1z‖ = ‖ψ
R
2z‖.
Furthermore,
φz ⊗ V ψ
R
1z
(∗)
= UU∗φz ⊗ V ψ
R
1z
(∗∗)
= (U ⊗ V )(proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
1z
(14)
= (U ′ ⊗ V ′)(proj(U ′∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
2z
(∗∗)
= U ′U ′∗φ′z ⊗ V
′ψR2z
(∗)
= φz ⊗ V
′ψR2z .
Here (∗) holds since φz ∈ imU ∩ imU
′. Here (∗∗) holds by definition of ψR1z , ψ
R
2z. Thus
φz ⊗ V ψ
R
1z = φz ⊗ V
′ψR2z. Since φz 6= 0, this implies V ψ
R
1z = V
′ψR2z . ⋄
Claim 4 Let γ ∈ ℓ2[Q] be orthogonal to all U∗φz. Then (proj(γ)⊗ id)ψ1 = 0.
Let γ′ ∈ ℓ2[Q′] be orthogonal to all U ′∗φz. Then (proj(γ
′)⊗ id)ψ2 = 0.
Proof of claim. We have (U ⊗ V )ψQR1 ∈ imU ⊗ H where H is the range of V, V
′.
We also have (U ′ ⊗ V ′)ψQR2 ∈ imU
′ ⊗H. Since (U ⊗ V )ψQR1 = (U
′ ⊗ V ′)ψQR2 , we have
(U ⊗ V )ψQR1 ∈ (imU ⊗H) ∩ (imU
′ ⊗H) = (imU ∩ imU ′)⊗H.
Since φz are a basis of imU∩imU
′, this implies that (U⊗V )ψQR1 ∈ span{φz}z⊗H, and
thus ψQR1 = (U
∗⊗V ∗)(U⊗V )ψQR1 ∈ span{U
∗φz}⊗ℓ
2[R]. Since γ is orthogonal to U∗φz ,
we then have (proj(γ)⊗ id)ψQR1 = 0. And since ψ1 = ψ
QR
1 ⊗ ψ
E
1 , (proj(γ)⊗ id)ψ1 = 0.
This shows the first half of the claim. The second half is shown analogously. ⋄
Claim 5 ρ′ satisfies B′.
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Proof of claim. We have that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ A
′ ⊆ B. Since fv(B) ∩ Q1Q
′
2 = ∅, and
proj(U∗φz),proj(U
′∗φz) operate on Q1,Q
′
2 respectively, we have that ψ1z ⊗ ψ2z =
(proj(U∗φz)⊗ id ⊗ proj(U
′∗φz)⊗ id)(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) ∈ B.
We thus have ψ1z ⊗ ψ2z = U
∗φz ⊗ ψ
R
1z ⊗ ψ
E
1 ⊗ U
′∗φz ⊗ ψ
R
2z ⊗ ψ
E
2 ∈ B. Since fv (B) ∩
Q1Q
′
2 = ∅ and U
∗φz, U
′∗φz are on Q1,Q
′
2 and nonzero, it follows that also ψ
′
z
(13)
= e1 ⊗
ψR1z ⊗ ψ
E
1 ⊗ e
′
2 ⊗ ψ
R
2z ⊗ ψ
E
2 ·
1
‖ψ1z‖2
∈ B. And obviously ψ′z ∈ span|e1〉Q1 ∩ span|e
′
2〉Q′2 .
(Because the only difference is in the tensor factors in Q1Q
′
2.) Furthermore, by Claim 3,
V ψR1z = V
′ψR2z . Thus by [27, Lemma 29], ψ1z ⊗ ψ2z ∈ span|e1〉Q1 ∩ span|e
′
2〉Q′2 .
Hence altogether ψ′z ∈ B
′. Thus ρ′ =
∑
z proj(ψ
′
z) satisfies B
′. ⋄
Claim 6 tr[1]ρ′ = JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m1〉⊗ ψ1)
)
and tr[2]ρ′ = JQ′
q
← e′K
(
proj(|m2〉⊗ ψ2)
)
.
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Proof of claim. Let E(ρ) := trQρ ⊗ proj(e1), the operation of initializing Q with the
state e. With that definition, JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m1〉)⊗ ρ
)
= proj(|m1〉)⊗ E(ρ).
Let Mz(ρ) := proj(U
∗φz)ρproj(U
∗φz)
∗. Since {φz}z∈Z are an orthonormal basis of
imU∩imU ′, and U is an isometry, {U∗φz}z∈Z are orthonormal. We can thus extend that
set to an orthonormal basis {U∗φz}z∈Z ∪ {γy}y∈Y . Let My(ρ) := proj(γy)ρproj(γy)
∗.
Then M(ρ) :=
∑
zMz(ρ) +
∑
yMy(ρ) is a CPTPM on Q.
We have
tr[1]proj(ψ′z)
(13)
= tr[1]proj(e1 ⊗ ψ
R
1z ⊗ ψ
E
1 ⊗ e
′
2 ⊗ ψ
R
2z ⊗ ψ
E
2 ) ·
1
‖ψR1z‖
2 = proj(e1 ⊗ ψ
R
1z ⊗ ψ
E
1 ) ·
‖ψR2z‖
2
‖ψR1z‖
2
(∗)
= proj(e1 ⊗ ψ
R
1z ⊗ ψ
E
1 )
(∗∗)
= E
(
proj(U∗φz ⊗ ψ
R
1z ⊗ ψ
E
1 )
) (∗∗∗)
= E
(
proj((proj(U∗φz)⊗ id)ψ
QR
1 ⊗ ψ
E
1 )
)
= E ◦ (Mz ⊗ id)
(
proj(ψQR1 ⊗ ψ
E
1 )
)(∗∗∗∗)
= E ◦ (Mz ⊗ id)
(
proj(ψ1)
)
. (15)
Here (∗) follows because the fraction is 1 by Claim 3. And (∗∗) uses that ‖U∗φz‖ = 1 since
φz is normalized and U is an isometry and φz ∈ imU ∩ imU
′. And (∗∗∗) by definition of
ψR1z , and (∗∗∗∗) by definition of ψ
QR
1 , ψ
E
1 .
Since M is a CPTPM on Q, and by definition of E , we have E ◦ (M⊗ id) = E .
Then
tr1ρ
′ (13)= tr1
∑
z
proj(|m1〉⊗ |m2〉⊗ ψ
′
z)
(15)
=
∑
z
proj(|m1〉)⊗ E
(
(Mz ⊗ id)(proj(ψ1))
)
= proj(|m1〉)⊗ E
(∑
z
(Mz ⊗ id)(proj(ψ1))
)
(∗)
= proj(|m1〉)⊗ E
(∑
z
(Mz ⊗ id)(proj(ψ1)) +
∑
y
(My ⊗ id)(proj(ψ1))
)
= proj(|m1〉)⊗ E
(
(M⊗ id)(proj(ψ1))
)(∗∗)
= proj(|m1〉)⊗ E(proj(ψ1))
(∗∗∗)
= JQ
q
← eK(proj(|m1〉)⊗ proj(ψ1))
Here (∗) follows from Claim 4. And (∗∗) is because E ◦ (M⊗ id) = E . And (∗∗∗) was
explained after the definition of E .
Thus we have shown tr[1]ρ′ = JQ
q
← eK
(
proj(|m1〉⊗ ψ1)
)
.
tr[2]ρ′ = JQ′
q
← e′K
(
proj(|m2〉⊗ ψ2)
)
is shown analogously. (With the sole exception
that we do not need Claim 3 to simplify the fraction in (15) because the nominator and
denominator are the same term in this case.) ⋄
As mentioned in the first paragraph of this proof, Claim 5 and Claim 6 implies the conclusion
of the rule. (ρ′ is separable by definition.) 
JointRemoveLocal
Q˜ ⊆ Q Q˜′ ⊆ Q′
fv (A,B) ∩Q1Q
′
2X1X
′
2 = ∅ A
′ := A ∩ (Q1 =q |•〉) ∩ (Q
′
2 =q |•〉) ∩ Cla[X1 = • ∧X
′
2 = •]
B′ := B ∩ Cla[U,U ′, V, V ′ are unitaries] ∩
(
(U ⊗ V )Q˜1R1 ≡quant (U
′ ⊗ V ′)Q˜2R
′
2
){
A′
}
c ∼ d
{
B′
}{
A
}
local QX; c∼ local Q′X′;d
{
B ∩ (VR1 ≡quant V
′R′2)
}
A simpler variant of this rule (that probably illustrates the core ideas better) is the following:
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JointRemoveLocal0
fv(A,B) ∩Q1Q2X1X2 = ∅{
A ∩ (Q1R1 ≡quant Q2R2) ∩ Cla[X1 = X2]
}
c ∼ d
{
B ∩ (Q1R1 ≡quant Q2R2)
}{
A ∩ (R1 ≡quant R2)
}
local QX; c ∼ local QX;d
{
B ∩ (R1 ≡quant R2)
}
We have not implemented a tactic for either of these rules in qrhl-tool. During the case
study [25], we first implemented and used a preliminary version9 of a local remove joint tactic.
However, after further improvements of the equal tactic (which is essentially an application of
the Adversary rule, see Section 9), and consequent rewriting of the affected proofs in the case
study, it turned out that all applications of local remove joint were gone. So it seems that a
tactic implementing JointRemoveLocal is not a high priority, and thus we did not implement
a final version of the local remove joint tactic. However, the rule JointRemoveLocal is
still important because it is used to prove the improved Adversary rule which made it possible
to remove the local remove joint tactic in the first place.
Proof of JointRemoveLocal. By rule JointQInitEq, we have{
B′
}
init Q˜∼ init Q˜′
{
B ∩ (VR1 ≡quant V
′R′2)
}
.
(The rule needs the premise fv(B) ∩ Q˜1Q˜
′
2 = ∅ which follows from the premises of
rule JointRemoveLocal.)
With the premise {A′}c ∼ d{B′} and rule Seq, we get{
A′
}
c; init Q˜ ∼ d; init Q˜′
{
B ∩ (VR1 ≡quant V
′R′2)
}
.
By consecutive application of rule RemoveLocal1 and RemoveLocal2, we get{
A
}
local QX; c; init Q˜∼ local QX;d; init Q˜′
{
B ∩ (VR1 ≡quant V
′R′2)
}
.
(This requires fv (A,B) ∩Q1Q
′
2X1X
′
2 = ∅ which is provided in the premises of this proof.)
By Lemma 7 (iii), local QX; c; init Q˜
d
= local QX; c and local QX;d; init Q˜′
d
=
local QX;d. (Using the premises Q˜ ⊆ Q, Q˜′ ⊆ Q′.)
Thus {
A
}
local QX; c ∼ local QX;d
{
B ∩ (VR1 ≡quant V
′R′2)
}
.

Proof of JointRemoveLocal0. We have (Q1 =q |•〉) ∩ (Q2 =q |•〉) ⊆ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) by
[27, Lemma 33]. And (Q1 ≡quant Q2) ∩ (R1 ≡quant R2) ⊆ (Q1R1 ≡quant Q2R2) since the lhs
consists of states invariant under swappingQ1 andQ2 and invariant under swappingR1 andR2,
while the rhs consists of states invariant doing both those swaps. And Cla[X1 = • ∧X1 = •] ⊆
Cla[X1 = X2].
Thus
A′ := A ∩ (Q1 =q |•〉) ∩ (Q
′
2 =q |•〉) ∩ Cla[X1 = • ∧X
′
2 = •]
⊆ A ∩ (Q1R1 ≡quant Q2R2) ∩ Cla[X1 = X2].
9Preliminary means that it was not based on the proven rule but instead was based on intuition and thus not
necessarily sound.
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we get with the qRHL judgment from the premise and rule Seq:
{A′}c∼ d{B ∩ (Q1R1 ≡quant Q2R2)}
By setting U,U ′, V, V ′ := id , Q′, Q˜, Q˜′ := Q, R′ := R in rule JointRemoveLocal, this
implies the conclusion of rule JointRemoveLocal0. 
The rule JointQInitEq also gives us the opportunity to easily strengthen the QrhlElimEq
rule from [28]. The rule QrhlElimEq allows us to derive a relationship between probabilities
(which is what we eventually care about in cryptographic proofs) from a qRHL judgment. The
new rule gives us more flexibility in terms of the variables that have to be involved in the
(quantum) equalities in the pre-/postconditions of that qRHL judgment.
QrhlElimEqNew
ρ satisfies A Q ⊇ fv(c) \ overwr (c) Q ⊇ fv (d) \ overwr (d)
Q ⊇ fv (A) {Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) ∩ A1 ∩ A2}c∼ d{Cla[e1 =⇒ f2]}
Pr[e : c(ρ)] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ)]
The same holds with ⇐⇒ / = instead of =⇒ / ≤.
We rewrote the tactic byqrhl in the qrhl-tool that implements the rule QrhlElimEq to
require the more liberal variable conditions from QrhlElimEqNew.
Proof. We first show an auxiliary claim:
Claim 7 For any program c and expression e and finite set of quantum variables Q, Pr[e :
(c; init Q)(ρ)] = Pr[e : c(ρ)].
Proof of claim. We show that Pr[e : (c; init q)(ρ)] = Pr[e : c(ρ)]. The general case
Pr[e : (c; init Q)(ρ)] = Pr[e : c(ρ)] follows by induction over Q.
Let ρ′ := JcK(ρ). If we write ρ′ as ρ′ =:
∑
m proj(|m〉Vcl) ⊗ ρ
′
m (here V
cl is the
set of all classical variables), by definition of Pr[e : c(ρ)] [27, Definition 9], we have
Pr[e : c(ρ)] =
∑
m s.t. JeKm=true
tr ρ′m.
Let ρ′′ := Jc; init qK(ρ). Since init q = q
q
← |•〉q by definition, ρ
′′ = Jq
q
← |•〉qK(ρ). By
the semantics of the language, ρ′′ =
∑
m proj(|m〉Vcl)⊗ρ
′′
m where ρ
′′
m = trQρ
′
m⊗proj(|•〉q).
Note that tr ρ′′m = tr ρ
′
m since
∥∥|•〉q∥∥ = 1.
Again by definition of Pr[. . . ], we have Pr[e : (c; init q)(ρ)] =
∑
m s.t. JeKm=true
tr ρ′′m.
Since tr ρ′′m = tr ρ
′
m, it follows that Pr[e : (c; init q)(ρ)] = Pr[e : c(ρ)]. ⋄
Let X˜ := X ∪ fv(c)cl ∪ fv (d)cl and Q˜ := Q ∪ fv(c)qu ∪ fv(d)qu and c˜ := init Q˜ \ Q; c.
d˜ := init Q˜ \Q; d.
We have
{Cla[X˜1 = X˜2] ∩ (Q˜1 ≡quant Q˜2) ∩ A1 ∩ A2}
⊆ {Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q˜1 ≡quant Q˜2) ∩ A1 ∩ A2} (since X ⊆ X˜)
init (Q˜ \Q) ∼ init (Q˜ \Q) {Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) ∩ A1 ∩ A2} (JointQInitEq0)
c ∼ d {e1 =⇒ f1} (by assumption)
The application of rule JointQInitEq0 uses that fv (A) ⊆ Q by assumption and therefore
fv (A1 ∩ A2) ∩ (Q˜ \Q)1(Q˜ \Q)2 = ∅.
39
Thus with rules Conseq and Seq, and by definition of c˜, d˜, we have
{Cla[X˜1 = X˜2] ∩ (Q˜1 ≡quant Q˜2) ∩ A1 ∩ A2}c˜ ∼ d˜{e1 =⇒ f1}.
Furthermore, we have that ρ satisfies A (by assumption) and fv (c˜), fv(d˜) ⊆ X˜Q˜ and
fv (A)qu ⊆ Q˜ (by definition of c˜, d˜, X˜, Q˜). Thus, by rule QrhlElimEq from [28], we have
Pr[e : c˜(ρ)] ≤ Pr[f : d˜(ρ)]. (16)
Furthermore,
c˜
d
= init (Q˜ \Q) ∩ overwr (c); init (Q˜ \Q) \ fv (c); c
d
= init (Q˜ \Q) ∩ overwr (c); c; init (Q˜ \Q) \ fv (c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:I
d
= c; init I (17)
The first
d
= follows since (Q˜ \Q) ∩ overwr (c)∪(Q˜ \Q) \ fv(c) = Q˜ \Q.a The second
d
= follows
by Lemma 2 (and using that (Q˜ \Q) \ fv(c) and fv (c) are disjoint). The third
d
= follows by
item iii (using that fv
(
(Q˜ \Q) ∩ overwr (c)
)
⊆ overwr (c)).
From (17), we get Pr[e : c˜(ρ)] = Pr[e : (c; init I)(ρ)]. Furthermore, by Claim 7, Pr[e :
(c; init I)(ρ)] = Pr[e : c(ρ)].
Thus Pr[e : c˜(ρ)] = Pr[e : c(ρ)]. Analogously, we have Pr[f : d˜(ρ)] = Pr[f : d(ρ)].
With (16), this implies Pr[e : c(ρ)] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ)] and concludes the proof.
(The case using ⇐⇒ / = instead of =⇒ / ≤ is shown analogously, using the corresponding
variant of rule QrhlElimEq.) 
aThe latter is shown in Isabelle/HOL, Helping_Lemmas.qrhlelimeq_aux.
8 Variable change in quantum equality
EqVarChange
TypelistQ = Type
list
Q′ Type
list
Q˜
= Typelist
Q˜′
|TypelistQ | ≤ |Type
list
Q˜
| or |Typelist
Q˜
| =∞
fv (A), fv (B) ∩Q1Q
′
2Q˜1Q˜
′
2 = ∅ fv (c) ∩QQ˜ = ∅ fv (d) ∩Q
′Q˜′ = ∅{
A ∩ (US ⊗ id)S1Q˜1 ≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q˜
′
2
}
c ∼ d
{
B ∩ (UR ⊗ id)R1Q˜1 ≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q˜
′
2
}
{
A ∩ (US ⊗ id)S1Q1 ≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q
′
2
}
c ∼ d
{
B ∩ (UR ⊗ id)R1Q1 ≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q
′
2
}
The above rule is implemented in qrhl-tool by the conseq qrhl tactic, which combines the
rule Seq with rule EqVarChange. That is, it allows to take a given, already proven qRHL judg-
ment, (optionally) replaces specified variables in the quantum equality in the pre/postcondition
by new variables, and then uses the resulting qRHL judgment X to solve the current subgoal Y
using the Seq rule. (This means the current subgoal Y must be a qRHL judgment as well with
the same programs as X , and new subgoals are created to show the relationship between the
pre/postconditions of X and Y .)
Proof. Let A∗,B∗ denote the pre-/postcondition of the conclusion, and A˜, B˜ denote the pre-
/postcondition of the premise.
Fix ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ A
∗. We need to show that there is a separable ρ′ such that tr2 ρ
′ =
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S1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
S′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
US
U ′S
U ′∗S
U∗S
(US ⊗ id)S1Q1
≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q
′
2
V
V
W1
W2
β0
β0
S1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
S′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
U1 ⊗ U2
Figure 4: Circuit: Quantum equality swap and U1 ⊗ U2
S1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
S′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
V
V
W1
W2
β0
β0
U1 ⊗ U2
US
U ′S
U ′∗S
U∗S
(US ⊗ id)S1Q˜1
≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q˜
′
2
S1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
S′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
Figure 5: Circuit: U1 ⊗ U2 and quantum equality swap
JcK
(
proj(ψ1)
)
and tr1 ρ
′ = JdK
(
proj(ψ2)
)
and supp ρ′ ⊆ B∗.
Let S1 := supp tr
[Q]proj(ψ1) ⊆ ℓ
2[Q] and S2 := supp tr
[Q]proj(ψ1) ⊆ ℓ
2[Q′] and S :=
S1+S2. (S1+S2 is meaningful because Type
list
Q = Type
list
Q′ and hence ℓ
2[Q] = ℓ2[Q′].) Since every
density operator has countably dimensional support, dimS1, dimS2 ≤ ℵ0 and thus dimS ≤ ℵ0.
Furthermore, dimS ≤ dim ℓ2[Q] ≤ |TypelistQ |. Since |Type
list
Q | ≤ |Type
list
Q˜
| or ℵ0 ≤ |Type
list
Q˜
| by
assumption of the rule, we have dimS ≤ |Typelist
Q˜
|. (Dimensions are Hilbert space dimensions,
not vector space dimensions.)
Let (βi)i∈I be a orthonormal basis of S, and let (βi)i∈B be an extension of that basis
to the whole space ℓ2[Q]. We have |I| = dimS ≤ |Typelist
Q˜
|. Thus there exists an injection
ι : I → Typelist
Q˜
. Fix such an ι.
Let q be a fresh variable (i.e., q /∈ fv (c,d,A∗,B∗, A˜, B˜)) with Typeq = (Type
list
Q˜
)∗.a Define
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R1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
R′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
UR
U ′R
U ′∗R
U∗R
(UR ⊗ id)R1Q1
≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q
′
2
β0
β0
W ∗
W ∗
V ∗
V ∗
R1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
R′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2
Figure 6: Circuit: Quantum equality swap and U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 . β0 stands for the projector
proj(β0).
R1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
R′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
β0
β0
W ∗
W ∗
V ∗
V ∗
U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2
UR
U ′R
U ′∗R
U∗R
(UR ⊗ id)R1Q1
≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q
′
2
R1
Q1
Q˜1
q1
R′2
Q′2
Q˜′2
q2
Figure 7: Circuit: U∗1⊗U
∗
2 and quantum equality swap. β0 stands for the projector proj(β0).
the bounded operator U : ℓ2[QQ˜q]→ ℓ2[QQ˜q] with
U
(
βa ⊗ |b〉Q˜ ⊗ |c〉q
)
=
{
β0 ⊗ |ι(a)〉Q˜ ⊗
∣∣b‖c〉
q
(a ∈ I, b ∈ Typelist
Q˜
)
0 (a /∈ I, b ∈ Typelist
Q˜
).
(Here 0 in the index of β0 refers to an arbitrary but fixed element of I.) Note that U is
also an operator ℓ2[Q′Q˜′q] → ℓ2[Q′Q˜′q]. In slight abuse of notation, we will also write U
for U ⊗ idQQ˜q∁ or U ⊗ idQ′Q˜′q∁ We write U1, U2 if U is applied to the left/right memory,
respectively.
Claim 8 U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2 ∈ A˜.
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Proof of claim. Since ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ A
∗, we have ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ A. Since fv (A)∩Q1Q
′
2Q˜1Q˜
′
2q1q2 =
∅ (by assumption of the rule ad definition of q), and U1, U2 operate on Q1Q
′
2Q˜1Q˜
′
2q1q2,
we have U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2 ∈ A.
Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ A
∗, we have ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ (US ⊗ id)S1Q1 ≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q
′
2. By
definition of the quantum equality, this means that ψ1⊗ψ2 is invariant under the quantum
circuit depicted in the black (left) part of Figure 4.
Furthermore, the blue (right) part of Figure 4 is an application of U1⊗U2 if we define
V , W as follows: V βa := |ι(a)〉 for a ∈ T , V βa := 0 otherwise. W
(
|b〉Q˜ ⊗ |c〉q
)
:=
∣∣b‖c〉
q
.
Thus the result of applying Figure 4 to ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 is U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2.
Furthermore, the blue (left) part of Figure 5 is U1⊗U2. And by definition of quantum
equality, a state is in (US ⊗ id)S1Q˜1 ≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q˜
′
2 iff it is invariant under the
black (right) part of Figure 5.
Thus, U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2 ∈ (US ⊗ id)S1Q˜1 ≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q˜
′
2 iff the result of applying
Figure 5 to ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 is U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2.
Furthermore, note that the circuits in Figures 4 and 5 compute the same function (they
are identical as networks of linear operations). Since the result of Figure 4 is U1ψ1⊗U2ψ2,
so is that of Figure 5. Thus U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2 ∈ (US ⊗ id)S1Q˜1 ≡quant (U
′
S ⊗ id)S
′
2Q˜
′
2 and
hence U1ψ1 ⊗ U2ψ2 ∈ A˜. ⋄
aStrictly speaking, we only require |Typeq| = |(Type
list
Q˜
)∗|, then we can identify Typeq with (Type
list
Q˜
)∗.
Such a q always exists for the following reason: If Typelist
Q˜
is infinite, then |Typelist
Q˜
| = |Typeq′ | for some q
′ ∈ Q˜.
And |(Typelist
Q˜
)∗| = |Typelist
Q˜
|. Thus we need q with Typeq = Typeq′ . Since we assume that there are infinitely
many variables of each type (see preliminaries), and since fv(c,d,A∗,B∗, A˜, B˜) is finite (see preliminaries), q
exists.
If Typelist
Q˜
is finite, then |(Typelist
Q˜
)∗| = ℵ0. Since we assume that there is a quantum variable of cardinality ℵ0
(see preliminaries), and of each type there are infinitely variables, and fv(c,d,A∗,B∗, A˜, B˜) is finite, q exists.
Since {A˜}c∼ d{B˜} by assumption, Claim 8 implies that there is a separable state ρ′′ such
that tr[1]ρ′′ = JcK(proj(Uψ1)) and tr
[2]ρ′′ = JdK(proj(Uψ2)) and supp ρ
′′ ⊆ B˜. Let ρ′ :=
toE(U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )
(
ρ′′
)
. (Here ∗ denotes an arbitrary but fixed element of Typeq.)
Claim 9 ρ′ is separable.
Proof of claim. ρ′′ is separable by definition. Thus ρ′ = toE(U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )
(
ρ′′
)
is separable.
⋄
Claim 10 tr[1]ρ′ = JcK
(
proj(ψ1)
)
and tr[2]ρ′ = JdK
(
proj(ψ2)
)
.
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Proof of claim. Since fv(c) ∩QQ˜q = ∅ (by assumption of the rule ad definition of q),
JcK and toE(U1) commute. Thus
tr[1]ρ′′ = JcK ◦ toE(U1)(proj(ψ1)) = toE(U1) ◦ JcK(proj(ψ1)). (18)
Thus supp tr[1]ρ′′ ⊆ imU1. Thus supp ρ
′′ ⊆ imU1 ⊗ ℓ
2(Vall2 ).
Analogously, supp ρ′′ ⊆ im ℓ2(Vall1 )⊗ imU2.
Let ρ˜ := toE(id ⊗ U∗2 )
(
ρ′′
)
. Since supp ρ′′ ⊆ ℓ2[Vall1 ]⊗ imU2, and U
∗
2 is an isometry
on imU2 (since U2 is an isometry), tr
[1]ρ˜ = tr[1]ρ′′. Then
tr[1]ρ′ = tr[1]toE(U∗1 ⊗ id)(ρ˜) = toE(U
∗
1 ) ◦ tr
[1]ρ˜ = toE(U∗1 ) ◦ tr
[1]ρ′′
(18)
= toE(U∗1 ) ◦ toE(U1) ◦ JcK(proj(ψ1))
(∗)
= JcK(proj(ψ1)).
Here (∗) uses that U1 is an isometry.
U∗2 , restricted to ℓ
2[Vall1 V
all
2 ] ⊗ span |∗〉q2 , is an isometry. Thus tr
[1]ρ˜ = tr[1]ρ′′ ⊗
proj(|∗〉q1). By definition of ρ
′′, we have tr[1]ρ′′ = JcKproj(U1ψ1). Thus tr
[1]ρ˜ =
JcKproj(U1ψ1)⊗ proj(|∗〉q1)
tr[2]ρ′ = JdK
(
proj(ψ2)
)
is shown analogously. ⋄
Claim 11 (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )B˜ ⊆ B
∗.
Proof of claim. Fix ψ ∈ B˜. Then ψ ∈ B. Since fv(B) ∩ Q1Q
′
2Q˜1Q˜
′
2q1q2 = ∅ (by
assumption of the rule ad definition of q), and U1, U2 operate on Q1Q2Q˜
′
1Q˜
′
2q1q2, we
have (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ ∈ B.
Since ψ ∈ B˜, we have ψ ∈ (UR⊗ id)R1Q˜1 ≡quant (U
′
R⊗ id)R
′
2Q˜
′
2. By definition of the
quantum equality, this means that ψ is invariant under the quantum circuit depicted in
the black (left) part of Figure 6.
Furthermore, the blue (right) part of Figure 6 is an application of U∗1 ⊗U
∗
2 if we define
V , W as in the proof of Claim 8.
Thus the result of applying Figure 6 to ψ is (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ.
Furthermore, the blue (left) part of Figure 5 is U∗1 ⊗U
∗
2 . And by definition of quantum
equality, a state is in (UR ⊗ id)R1Q1 ≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q
′
2 iff it is invariant under the
black (right) part of Figure 7.
Thus, (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ ∈ (UR ⊗ id)R1Q1 ≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q
′
2 iff the result of applying
Figure 7 to ψ is (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ.
Furthermore, note that the circuits in Figures 6 and 7 compute the same function (they
are identical as networks of linear operations). Since the result of Figure 4 is (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ,
so is that of Figure 7. Thus (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ ∈ (UR ⊗ id)R1Q1 ≡quant (U
′
R ⊗ id)R
′
2Q
′
2 and
hence (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )ψ ∈ B
∗. ⋄
Claim 12 supp ρ′ ⊆ B∗.
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Proof of claim. By definition of ρ′′, we have supp ρ′′ ⊆ B˜. Furthermore, ρ′ =
toE(U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )(ρ
′′) by definition. Thus
supp ρ′ ⊆ (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 ) supp ρ
′′ ⊆ (U∗1 ⊗ U
∗
2 )B˜
(∗)
⊆ B∗.
Here (∗) is by Claim 11. ⋄
Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ A
∗ was arbitary, from Claims 9, 10 and 12, we immediately get
{A∗}c∼ d{B∗}. 
9 Adversary rule
Auxiliary notation: ≡ V stands for Vqu1 ≡quant V
qu
2 ∩ Cla[V
cl
1 = V
cl
2 ].
Adversary
R is a predicate si, s
′
i are programs
C is a multi-hole context Vin ,Vmid ,Vout are finite sets of variables
qaux is a quantum variable VR := {x : x1 ∈ R ∨ x2 ∈ R}
|Typeqaux | =∞ qaux /∈ VR ∀i.qaux /∈ fv(si) ∀i.qaux /∈ fv (s
′
i)
qaux ∈ Vmid inner(C) ⊆ Vmid Vout ⊆ Vmid Vout \ overwr (C) ⊆ Vin
(Vout \Vin ) ∩VR = ∅ V
qu
in ⊆ Vout ∪ overwr (C) (Vin \Vout )
qu ∩VR = ∅
Vmid ∩VR ⊆ Vin ∪ covered(C) (Vmid ∩VR)
qu ⊆ Vout ∪ covered(C)
∀i.Vmid ∩
(
fv (si) ∪ fv (s
′
i)
)
⊆ Vin ∪ covered(C) ∪
(
overwr (si) ∩ overwr (s
′
i)
)cl
∀i.Vqumid ∩
(
fv (si) ∪ fv (s
′
i)
)
⊆ Vout ∪ covered(C)
fv(C) ⊆ Vmid fv (C) ⊆ Vin ∪ overwr (C) fv (C) ∩VR ⊆ Vin fv (C)
qu ⊆ Vout
VR ∩ inner(C) = ∅ VR ∩ written(C) = ∅ ∀i.{R ∩ ≡Vmid}si ∼ s
′
i{R ∩≡Vmid}
{R ∩ ≡Vin}C[s1, . . . , sn]∼ C[s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n]{R ∩≡Vout}
This is shown in Isabelle/HOL, as adversary_rule in theory Adversary_Rule.thy. See
Section 1.1 for remarks about our Isabelle/HOL development.
We have implemented this rule in the equal tactic in qrhl-tool.10 The tactic allows to apply
this rule to the last statement on the left/right side (or suffix consisting of several statements, if
the user chooses). The sets Vin ,Vmid ,Vout can be used specified but the tactic makes a best
effort attempt to find the minimum sets Vin ,Vmid ,Vout that make all the premises of the rule
true. The tactic also automatically rewrites the postcondition into the form R ∩ ≡Vout in a
way that makes R as weak as possible. For more details about the equal tactic, see the manual
of [23].
In many situations, the tactic makes it very easy to apply the Adversary rule. A manual
application would be very inconvenient because there are many technical conditions that need to
be checked. Yet, in our case study [25], in many situations no arguments to equal are needed at
all, and when they were needed, it was only to specify the quantum variables in Vmid to control
which variables occur (and in what order) in the subgoals {R ∩≡Vmid}si ∼ s
′
i{R ∩≡Vmid} for
the mismatches si, s
′
i.
10The tactic is called equal because in its most basic form, it reasons about two programs that are identical
(e.g., the same adversary invocation in the left and right program). In more advanced situations, the two programs
can differ but the idea is still that this tactic can be applied when the last statement on the left/right side are
“mostly equal”.
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Symbol index
S⊥ Orthogonal complement of subspace S 10
suppM Support of an operator M 10
toE(U) Superoperator corresponding to U . I.e. toE(U)(ρ) :=
UρU∗.
9
47
q, r A quantum program variable 9, 10
Pr[e : c(ρ)] Probability that e holds after running c on initial state ρ 13
V,W List/set of program variables
•v Default value for variable v 12
ρ•v Density operator with default value for variable v 12
SWAPv↔v′ Unitary swapping v, v
′ 10
init v Program: Initialize v with default value 23
f(x := y) Function update, i.e., (f(x := y))(x) = y
i i-th hole in a context 11
Vall Set of all program variables that can be used in the execu-
tion of a program
9
written(c) Variables written by c 13
inner(C) Inner variables of context C 13
x← e Program: assigns expression e to x 10, 12
suppµ Support of distribution µ 10
true Truth value “true”
false Truth value “false”
A»Q Lifts operator or subspace to variables Q 16
E A superoperator
ℓ2[V ] ℓ2(TypesetV ) – Hilbert space with basis Type
set
V 9
A⊗B Tensor product of vectors/operators A and B
↓e(ρ) Restrict state/distribution ρ to the case e = true holds 12
c;d Sequential composition of programs 12
v,w A program variable (classical or quantum) 10
x,y A classical program variable 9, 10
eσ, cσ Apply variable substitution σ to expression e 15
e{f/x} Substitute f for variable x in e
idV Identity over variables V
id Identity
X1 ≡quant X2 Equality of quantum variables X1 and X2 16, 16, 17
proj(x) Projector onto x. More precisely, xx∗ 9
|x| Absolute value of x / cardinality of set x
V cl Classical variables in V 9
V qu Quantum variables in V 9
Typev Type of variable v 9
fv (e) Free variables in an expression e (or program) 13, 16
TypelistV Type of a list V of variables 9
TypesetX Type of a set V of variables 9
JeKm Denotation of a classical expression e, evaluated on classi-
cal memory m
9
Typeexpe Type of an expression e 9
Localv[E ] Superoperator E with variable v made local
spanA Span, smallest subspace containing A
48
A,B,C (Quantum) predicates
noconflict(σ, c) Renaming c with σ leads to no free variable conflict 15
c !σ Full substitution (incl. local variables) 15
Cla[e] Classical predicate meaning e = true 16
c
d
= d Denotational equivalence 13
V =q ψ Predicate: V is in state ψ
overwr (c) Overwritten variables of c 13
covered(C) Covered variables of context C 13
Q,R,S List/set of quantum program variables
X,Y List/set of classical program variables
JcK Denotation of a program c 12
c,d A program 10
if e then c1 else c2 Statement: If (conditional) 12
skip Program that does nothing 10
x
$
← e Statement: Sample x according to distribution e 10, 12
while e do c Statement: While loop 10, 12
apply q1 . . .qn to U Statement: Apply unitary/isometry U to quantum regis-
ters q1 . . .qn
10, 12
q1 . . .qn
q
← e Statement: Initialize q1, . . . ,qn with quantum state e 10, 12
ℓ2(B) Hilbert space with basis indexed by B 9
x←measure q1 . . .qn with e Statement: Measure quantum variables q1 . . .qn with
measurement e
10, 12
|b〉, |b〉V Basis vector in Hilbert space ℓ
2[V ]
A∗ Adjoint of the operator A 10
trM Trace of matrix/operator M
‖x‖ ℓ2-norm of vector x, or operator-norm
dom f Domain of f
imA Image of A
tr[V ]W (ρ) Partial trace, keeping variables V , dropping variables W 10, 10
marginali(µ) i-th marginal distribution of µ 10
E initv Superoperator initializing v 23
{F}c∼ c′{G} Quantum relational Hoare judgment 17
A÷ ψ Part of A containing ψ 16
local V ; c Program: c with local variables V 10
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Index
Adversary (rule), 45
Assign1 (rule), 19
byqrhl (tactic), 39
Case (rule), 18
classical variable, 9
Conseq (rule), 18
conseq qrhl (tactic), 40
cq-operator, 9
default value, 12
Equal (rule), 18
equal (tactic), 45
EqVarChange (rule), 40
Frame (rule), 18
If1 (rule), 19
JointIf (rule), 19
JointMeasureSimple (rule), 20
JointQInitEq (rule), 34
JointQInitEq0 (rule), 34
JointRemoveLocal (rule), 37
JointRemoveLocal0 (rule), 38
JointSample (rule), 19
JointWhile (rule), 19
local remove (tactic), 32
local up (tactic), 30
Measure1 (rule), 20
predicate
quantum, 16
program
well-typed, 11
program variable, 9
classical, 9
quantum, 9
QApply1 (rule), 20
QInit1 (rule), 20
QrhlElim (rule), 18
QrhlElimEq (rule), 18
QrhlElimEqNew (rule), 39
quantum predicate, 16
quantum variable, 9
RemoveLocal1 (rule), 32
rename (tactic), 32
RenameQrhl1 (rule), 32
Sample1 (rule), 19
satisfy, 16
Seq (rule), 18
Skip (rule), 19
substitution
variable, 15
superoperator, 10
Sym (rule), 18
TransSimple (rule), 18
variable
classical, 9
program, 9
quantum, 9
variable substitution, 15
well-typed (program), 11
While1 (rule), 19
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